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Chapter 2
Introduction
Non-cooperative game theory has become the language for most of microe-
conomic modeling and a significant part of macroeconomic modeling. De-
scribing a strategic environment explicitly amounts to writing down an ex-
tensive form game.1 Applied game theory often applies the conceptual tools
from game theory with calculus and recursive optimization methods. Ap-
plied games tend to be infinite. Prices and quantities can take on a contin-
uum of values. Abstract existence theorems are of much less relevance in
applied work, equilibria are shown to exist by actually finding them. On
the other hand, applied game theory makes often strong conceptual sim-
plifications. The focus is often on symmetric equilibria and on equilibria
in pure strategies. Dynamic games are often analyzed by restrictive solu-
tion concepts such as Markov perfect equilibrium or open-loop equilibrium.
The papers in this thesis share the aim of understanding applied game the-
oretic modeling through the lens of classical game theory. They also share
a methodological approach that tries to isolate the relevant information for
understanding concepts. These two themes will run through the present
discussion of the three papers that make up this thesis.
1In epistemic game theory, beliefs are often treated as part of the strategic environment
too. See, for example, (Aumann & Dreze, 2008) for a strong statement of this view.
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2.1 Payoff-Relevance
Many strategic interactions occur over time, often without any natural end-
ing. So dynamic games are popular for modeling many phenomena, from
models of fishing to monetary policy. Dynamic games allow for very com-
plex strategies, there is much a player can condition on. The predictive
power of standard solution concepts such as subgame perfect equilibrium
is weak. Folk theorem style reasoning can often be used to show that any-
thing goes. In order to obtain sharper predictions, significant restrictions
on strategies are often imposed. The most popular such approach relies on
stationary strategies, strategies are only allowed to depend on exogenously
given states. A profile of stationary strategies with the property that every
strategy is optimal, in its restricted class, at every state is known as a Markov
perfect equilibrium, a closed-loop equilibrium, or a stationary equilibrium.
Using standard dynamic programming methods, one can show that (under
rather mild assumptions) such a strategy profile is actually a subgame per-
fect equilibrium without any restrictions (see, for example, 14.2.3. in (Amir,
2006)). The official reason usually given for using Markov perfect equilibria
is that one wants to have a model in which behavior depends only on the
“payoff-relevant states of the world”. But what is payoff-relevant should be
determined by the extensive form game itself, and not be a modeling choice.
For this reason, Maskin and Tirole proposed a way of deriving the payoff-
relevant states in terms of the extensive form in (Maskin & Tirole, 2001).
The basic idea is the following: If one starts with an exogenously given set
of states such that the game has a stationary structure with respect to this
set of states, one can identify each state with the set of histories leading to
the state. This way, one gets a partition of the nonterminal histories with the
property that any two histories in the same cell allow for the same continu-
ations and players induced preferences over strategies are the same at both
histories, provided all other players use stationary strategies. So Maskin
and Tirole took the coarsest such partition to be the set of payoff-relevant
states. To show that such a partition actually exists, they made two restric-
tive assumptions. First, they assumed that there are finitely many players
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who can at each history choose only among finitely many actions. Second,
players can explicitly condition on calendar time. This rules out the majority
of applications of Markov perfect equilibria, which are in games with infi-
nite action spaces and use time-independent strategies. Luckily, as I show,
one can prove their result without any assumptions by using some tools
from lattice theory. This makes their notions applicable to a large literature
of applied dynamic games in economics. But there is a deeper conceptual
problem in their formulation of payoff-relevance. Equivalent histories are
required to allow for equivalent continuations. But continuations are not
defined in terms of deep strategic structure. They are sequences of names of
actions and names are not payoff-relevant. Their reformulation of Markov
perfect equilibrium does not have any bite when one allows for a relabeling
of actions. I do provide I partial fix: I show that for a large class of games
that are “not too symmetric”, there exists a canonical labeling of actions in
terms of deep strategic structure that ensures that Markov perfect equilibria
behave the way they should and induce isomorphic behavior in isomorphic
subgames, thus satisfying what is commonly known as "subgame consis-
tency”.
I want to emphasize that I analyze the notion of payoff-relevance in order
to understand a widely employed solution concept better. I do not advocate
its use and see a lot of merit in considering history-dependent behavior.
2.2 Commitment in Extensive Form Games
Another popular solution concept for dynamic games is open-loop equilib-
rium. In an open-loop equilibrium, the behavior of a player depends only
on time and not on what a player learns about the behavior of other play-
ers. Open-loop equilibria are often taken as the “commitment solution of
a game” (see, for example, (Van Long, 2010)). They are usually not sub-
game perfect, but Nash. Now, most commitment problems in economics
strike me as problems of conditional commitments, as problems of threats
and promises. In the paper, I provide a notion of modeling commitment
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that strikes me as a more faithful rendition of the idea of commitment. A
different reason for studying commitments was motivated by my first expo-
sure to game theory. There I learned about Nash equilibrium and later that
Nash equilibrium relies on threats and promises that are not credible, which
motivated more demanding solution concepts such as subgame perfect equi-
librium and sequential equilibrium. But this was not a formal statement. If
it were true, one would assume that one obtains Nash equilibria when incor-
porating all possible commitments in a game and then apply an equilibrium
notion that does not rely on some implicit commitments. In my framework,
this turned out not to be true. Nash equilibrium behavior (in pure strategies)
can be supported by commitments, but not only Nash behavior.
The actual formal approach I take is in the spirit of (Schelling, 1960).
Players commit by burning their bridges. They can, at each round, publicly
dispose of some available choices at no cost. I start with an extensive form
game with perfect recall in which the notion of “every round” is meaning-
ful and construct a new extensive form game that takes the original game
and allows for all possible commitments. To analyze behavior with commit-
ments, I examine the sequential equilibria in the extended game. Every such
equilibrium induces a distribution over the outcomes in the original game
and I take such distributions to be commitment outcomes. The central re-
sult says that every play induced by a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is
a commitment solution. The result fails for mixed strategy Nash equilibria
or if commitments are not completely costless, as two examples show.
2.3 Strategic Stochastic Processes
The last paper of the thesis is joint work with Klaus Ritzberger. Together
with Carlos Alós-Ferrer, he developed an extremely general framework for
studying extensive forms in (Alós-Ferrer & Ritzberger, 2005) and (Alós-
Ferrer & Ritzberger, 2008). They clarified many foundational questions such
as when exactly strategy profiles induce outcomes uniquely. Something that
was still missing in their framework was a theory of strategic randomization;
their framework was essentially deterministic. We are working on closing
10
this gap.
This paper contains essential building blocks for a general theory of ran-
domization in extensive form games. Ultimately, we want to have a very
general framework for studying strategic randomization in extensive forms.
The paper focuses on two areas: The modeling of information by certain
quotients of measurable spaces and the general measure theoretic machin-
ery that has to run in the background. The class of extensive forms is re-
stricted to ones in which there is perfect recall and players are aware of
calendar time, a case general enough to develop the main themes. These
themes are also the part where most of my individual contribution lies. We
plan on developing the framework in full generality. It is shown that a form
of Kuhn’s theorem holds in the present framework: For every mixed strat-
egy, there is an outcome-equivalent behavior strategy. The proof builds on
previous work in (Aumann, 1964) and (Mertens et al., 1994), but delivers,
within the class of games considered, a stronger result.
There are many ways to represent finite extensive forms that are essen-
tially equivalent. Moreover, showing this equivalence is usually straightfor-
ward. The extensive forms we consider in this paper are in the spirit of (von
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947), making a choice amounts to reducing the
set of feasible outcomes. Part of the paper is showing that various equiva-
lent formulations are also equivalent in the measure theoretic sense, certain
isomorphisms turn out to be measurable isomorphisms with the structure
we use.
This paper has clearly a slightly mathematical bent and there is no point
in trying to hide this fact. The organization therefore follows the logical
development more than the economic ideas. To make the paper reasonably
self-contained, there are two appendices to clarify notation and terminology
and gather part of the mathematical background that is less widely known.
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Chapter 3
Payoff-Relevance
3.1 Introduction
We prefer simple models to complicated models. In game theory, we deal
with models in which the players use models themselves. A player has to
have a model of the strategic environment she faces and that model has
to contain everything that is relevant to her decision making. Yet what is
relevant to her, will often depend on the models used by other players. A
seemingly irrelevant variable may become important to her because other
players make their behavior conditional on that variable and their behavior
matters to the player.
The model of the strategic environment used when making a choice will
usually depend on past play. Partially because past play influences what
players can do and want, partially because other players take past play into
account themselves. We want to focus on the former aspect, so we have
to look at minimal models of the past and we have to look at the models
of players jointly. The models players will use in this paper are simply sets
of states, with each state summarizing the part of the past that is still rele-
vant to today’s decision making, states are what is payoff-relevant. Players
employ their models when making decisions, they choose strategies that de-
pend on states alone. We will look at how small such models can be in order
to drop as much payoff-irrelevant knowledge of the past as possible.
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Our starting point is the reformulation of a (stationary) Markov perfect
equilibrium due to Maskin and Tirole in (Maskin & Tirole, 2001).1 When
payoff-relevant states were still just a modelling choice made on a case by
case basis, they undertook the important task of defining the payoff relevant
states in terms of the extensive form. In the setting of dynamic games with
observable actions, they defined a Markov perfect equilibrium as a subgame-
perfect equilibrium in which every player’s strategy is “measurable with re-
spect to the coarsest partition of histories for which, if all other players
use measurable strategies, each player’s decision-problem is also measur-
able.” By this, they provided an explicit foundation for what is basically the
most popular solution concept for dynamic and stochastic games in applied
work.2
In order to show that such a partition actually exists, Maskin and Tirole
made two restrictive assumptions: They assumed that all players can condi-
tion on calendar time and they assumed that players can choose only among
finitely many actions when called to make a decision. The first assumption
goes against the spirit of payoff-relevance, the second assumption rules out
many important applications of dynamic games. Both restrictions turn out
to be superfluous (Theorem 1).
The definition of payoff-relevant states by Maskin and Tirole is quite sen-
sitive to what they take to be decision problems. Two actions are treated dif-
ferently, whenever they have different names. For this reason, in a Markov
perfect equilibrium, players may make non-isomorphic choices in isomor-
phic subgames. But names of actions are not payoff relevant, they merely
decorate the game tree. In general, their notion of Markov Perfect Equilib-
rium may tell us very little about what the payoff-relevant states are. Actu-
ally, any subgame-perfect equilibrium becomes a stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium after a simple relabeling of actions (Theorem 2). This is not
just troubling on a conceptual basis, it also renders the concept inapplica-
ble when one uses a definition of the extensive form that does not identify
1An accessible textbook treatment of their approach can be found in (Mailath & Samuel-
son, 2006), section 5.6.
2See (Amir, 2006) for an overview.
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different actions by names. In the classical graph-theoretic definition of the
extensive form of Kuhn in (Kuhn, 1953), Markov perfect equilibrium cannot
even be defined.
For a large class of dynamic games that are “sufficiently asymmetric”,
there exists a canonical labeling of actions that ensures that all Markov per-
fect equilibria induce isomorphic choices in isomorphic subgames (Theorem
3). Moreover, this labeling uses only information included in every rea-
sonable definition of the extensive form (payoffs and the order structure of
moves). For games outside this class of games, a relabeling of this kind may
not exist.
Major proofs are collected in an appendix.
3.2 Environment
We will focus exclusively on games with observable actions3 in discrete time.
In the usual definition of an extensive form game, dynamics are represented
by a graph and information and choices are modeled by partitions. For
games with observable actions, such a definition is unnecessarily cumber-
some. Information sets coincide with histories and making an arbitrary
temporal ordering of moves when players move simultaneously adds only
irrelevant information. For our analysis, we will take histories, which are
nothing but sequences of action profiles, as the basic unit of analysis. Our
formal model has three ingredients: A set of players, a set of histories and
for each player, preferences over plays.
We start with a set of players I. We merely require I to be nonempty, we do
not rule out an infinity of players. Our second ingredient is a set H of his-
tories. The members of H are finite or infinite sequences of I-tuples.4 Each
term of the sequence is an action profile and each coordinate in an action
3Such games are also known as games of almost perfect information, games with perfect
monitoring, or as simultaneous move games.
4Formally, an I-tuple is simply a function with domain I.
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profile is an action. We have to impose some consistency requirements on
H:
(i) The empty sequence ∅ belongs to H.
(ii) If (at)T1t=1 ∈ H (with T1 ∈ N ∪ {∞}) and T2 < T1 then (at)T2t=1 ∈ H.
(iii) If (at)Tt=1 ∈ H for all T ∈ N then (at)∞t=1 ∈ H.
(iv) Suppose h is not of maximal length. For each player i ∈ I, let
Ai(h) =
{
ai : ∃a−i such that
(
h, (ai,a−i)
) ∈ H}.
Then for all a ∈∏i∈IAi(h), (h,a) ∈ H.
The conditions (i) and (ii) ensure that H has a well defined tree structure.
Condition (iii) for infinite histories ensures that maximal histories exist even
when the time horizon is infinite. Finally, condition (iv) guarantees that the
actions a player can play after a certain history are independent of what the
others play after that history.
We call histories of maximal length plays and all other histories nonterminal
histories. We denote the set of nonterminal histories by H∗, these are the
histories where players can actually act. Clearly, they all have finite length.
The last ingredient in our definition of the extensive form is a reflexive,
complete and transitive preference ordering i over plays for each player
i ∈ I. So (I,H, (i)i∈I) is a game. We may refer to the set alone H also as a
game form.
This framework is quite flexible. We can model situations in which only
some players can choose after some history by allowing the other players
only to "choose" one single action. This way, we can accommodate games
of perfect information, games with overlapping generations of players as
in (Bhaskar, 1998), and games with long- and short-run players as in (Fu-
denberg & Levine, 1989). Technically, we could even work with histories
indexed by large ordinals and accommodate transfinite games such as long
cheap talk as in (Aumann & Hart, 2003).
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A (pure) strategy for player i ∈ I is a function si that maps each nonter-
minal history h to an action in Ai(h). We restrict ourselves to pure strate-
gies in order to avoid measurability problems when dealing with continua
of actions. When we specify a strategy for each player, we get a strategy
profile (si)i∈I. By recursion, every strategy profile determines a unique play.
A continuation c of a nonterminal history h is a sequence of action pro-
files that makes the sequence (h, c) a play.5 So a continuation is "what can
happen after h". At each nonterminal history, every player i ∈ I has con-
ditional preferences hi over continuations such that c hi c ′ if and only if
(h, c) i (h, c ′).
Given a nonterminal history h of length T , we define an h-subgame
(I,Hh, (hi )i∈I) in a natural way. The set of histories consists of all con-
tinuations and initial segments of continuations. The continuations are the
plays and preferences for player i are simplyhi . Every strategy si for player
i induces a unique continuation strategy si|h in the h-subgame by setting
si|h(h
′) = si
(
(h,h ′)
)
. Since every strategy profile induces a unique play,
every player has preferences over her strategies, for fixed strategies of the
others. By slight abuse of notation, we also write si i s ′i. A subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the game (I,H, (i)i∈I) is a strategy profile such that for ev-
ery player i ∈ I, every nonterminal history h, and every possible strategy s
of player i, the inequality s|h hi si|h holds.
Finally, we will need some mathematical definitions related to partitions: A
partition Π of a set X is a family of nonempty, pairwise disjoint subsets of
X such that
⋃
P∈Π P = X. We call the elements of a partition cells. If Π1
and Π2 are partitions of X, we say that Π1 is coarser than Π2 if every cell in
Π1 is a union of cells in Π2. This is equivalent to every cell in Π2 being the
subset of a cell in Π1. Let Π be a partition of X and f be a function defined
on X. We say that f is Π-measurable, if for every cell P ∈ Π and every two
elements x,y ∈ P, we have f(x) = f(y). When x and y are in the same cell
of the partition Π, we will say that x and y are Π-equivalent.
5The notation (h, c) denotes the concatenation of the sequences h and c. The context
should prevent confusion when the same notation is used for ordered pairs. What we call
continuations, are futures in (Maskin & Tirole, 2001).
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3.3 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
A partition profile (Πi)i∈I lists for each player i ∈ I, a partition Πi of H∗.
A partition profile should provide a model of the relevant past for every
player that encompasses the current strategic environment. For this, we
need the following consistency conditions, taken from (Maskin & Tirole,
2001). A partition profile (Πi)i∈I is consistent if it satisfies the following
two conditions:
(i) If the histories h1 and h2 are Πi-equivalent for any player i ∈ I, then
h1 and h2 have the same continuations.
(ii) Suppose all players j 6= i employ Πj-measurable strategies. If h1 and
h2 are Πi-equivalent, then si|h1 h1i s ′i|h1 if and only if si|h2 h2i
s ′i|h2 for all strategies si and s
′
i of player i such that si|h1 = si|h2 and
s ′i|h1 = s
′
i|h2.
Condition (i) formalizes the idea that all players can behave in the same
way in the future and condition (ii) that one can restrict oneself to strate-
gies measurable with respect to ones own partition, provided everybody else
choose strategies measurable with respect to their partitions. Condition (ii)
does not imply that the preferences over continuations are the same. Con-
sider two histories ending in the following one-shot games:
L R
T (3,3) (1,3)
B (3,1) (1,1)
L R
T (1,1) (3,1)
B (1,3) (3,3)
Clearly, both players have different preferences over continuations. But due
to the special structure of this example, a player’s payoff depends in both
games only on the action chosen by the other player. So both players are
indifferent between their actions and hence continuation strategies. So (ii)
holds trivially.
A partition profile (Πi)i∈I is dated if any two histories h1 and h2 that are
Πi-equivalent for some player i are of the same length. In a dated partition
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profile, players employing measurable strategies can condition on calendar
time.
What we are really after are minimal models. We say that the partition
profile (Πi)i∈I is coarser than the partition profile (Π ′i)i∈I if Πi is coarser
than Π ′i for every player i ∈ I. A coarser partition profile corresponds to
players using smaller models.
Theorem 1 There exists a coarsest consistent partition profile and a coarsest
consistent dated partition profile.
The maximally coarse consistent partition profile contains for every player
all payoff-relevant information, they form the state space for the player. A
special case of this result has been obtained by Maskin and Tirole. They
show that a coarsest consistent dated partition profile exists when no player
can choose among infinitely many actions after some history and when the
set of players is finite. For finitely many players, they have also shown that
maximally coarse consistent partition-profiles exist in general by employing
Zorn’s lemma. They did not rule out the possibility of different, incompara-
ble, maximally coarse consistent partitions in that case.
In applied work, one usually assumes that there is a single state space shared
by all players. Our formulation allows for different players to have differ-
ent partitions in the coarsest consistent partition profile. One could easily
formulate everything in terms of a partition common to all players. It is
also possible to rule out a diversity of partitions by essentially requiring that
everything some player does has an impact on every other player at every
time. This is the approach employed by Maskin and Tirole. The assumption
is satisfied in games in which everyone’s strategic possibilities depend on
some aggregate stock, such as the stock of fish in the classical fishwar model
in (Levhari & Mirman, 1980).
Finally, Maskin and Tirole define a Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) as a
subgame perfect strategy profile in which every player plays a strategy mea-
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surable with respect to her partition in the coarsest consistent dated parti-
tion profile. They define stationary Markov Perfect Equilibrium (SMPE) as
a subgame perfect strategy profile in which every player plays a strategy
measurable with respect to her partition in the coarsest consistent partition
profile. For expositional clarity, we focus on the latter. The discussion can
easily be adopted to the dated case.
3.4 Limitations of MPE and SMPE
When we defined consistent partition profiles, we required that two histories
are equivalent for any player only if they allow for the same continuations.
But sequences of action profiles are a poor representation of a decision prob-
lem. In a (S)MPE, players may face isomorphic subgames differing only
by the names of actions and behave differently in the two subgames. So
(S)MPE does not conform to reasonable notions of subgame consistency6.
To make this precise, we need to formalize a notion of being essentially the
same.
An isomorphism between the games (I,H, (i)i∈I) and (I,H ′, ( ′i)i∈I) is a
bijection φ : H→ H ′ such that:
(i) For two histories h1 and h2, h1 is an initial segment of h2 if and only
if φ(h1) is an initial segment of φ(h2).
(ii) For any nonterminal history h there exists a family (φhi )i∈I of bijec-
tions φi : Ai(h)→ A ′i(φ(h)) such that
φ
(
h, (ai)i∈I
)
=
(
φ(h), (φhi (ai))i∈I
)
.
(iii) For any two plays h1 and h2 and any player i, h1 i h2 if and only if
φ(h1)  ′i φ(h2).
6The concept of subgame-consistency was explicitely introduced in (Selten & Güth,
1982). The idea itself is already in (Selten, 1965).
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Condition (i) guarantees that φ is an order-isomorphism under the “is an
initial segment of”-ordering. Condition (iii) makes it an order isomorphism
on the terminal histories for the preferences of each player. Condition (ii) is
required to preserve the internal product structure of histories. Isomorphic
games are the same in everything that is payoff relevant. But by a mere
relabeling of actions, we can change every subgame-perfect equilibrium into
a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 2 Given any game, there exists an isomorphic game in which every
subgame-perfect equilibrium is a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
If φ is an isomorphism between (I,H, (i)i∈I) and (I,H ′, ( ′i)i∈I) and
(si)i∈I is a strategy profile for (I,H, (i)i∈I), there is also an induced strat-
egy profile (sφi )i∈I for (I,H
′, ( ′i)i∈I). Let h be a nonterminal history in H
of length T and h ′ be the unique history of lenth T + 1 that occurs when
all players follow the strategy profile (si)i∈I at h. Now s
φ
i
(
φ(h)
)
is simply
defined to be the ith coordinate of the last term of φ(h ′).
With this definition out of the way, we can define subgame consistency.
A strategy profile (si)i∈I in a game (I,H, (i)i∈I) is subgame-consistent
if, whenever there is an isomorphism φ between two subgames, then we
have φ(si(h)) = s
φ
i (φ(h)) for all ∈ I and every nonterminal history h in
the first game. Informally, in a subgame-consistent strategy profile, play-
ers facing the same strategic situation behave in the same way. By our last
result, there clearly exists stationary Markov perfect equilibria that are not
subgame-consistent.
Suppose there are two different isomorphisms between subgames. Then
some strategy profile in one subgame induces different strategy profiles un-
der the different isomorphisms. Such a strategy profile cannot be subgame-
consistent. To avoid this problem, we look at games in which two subgames
can be isomorphic in only one way. Formally, we say that a game is rigid if
the only isomorphism of the game with itself is the identity mapping.
Remark 1 A game is rigid if and only if no two subgames are isomorphic to
each other in more than one way.
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Proof: Since the whole game is a subgame, if two subgames are isomorphic
to each other in only one way, the game must be rigid. Conversely, we ob-
serve first that every isomorphism from a subgame to itself can be extended
to an isomorphism on the whole game that maps each history outside the
subgame to itself. So in a rigid game, every subgame can be isomorphic to it-
self only under the identity. Now, if f and f ′ are different isomorphism from
one subgame to another, then f−1 ◦f and f−1 ◦f ′ are different isomorphisms
of the first subgame to itself, which cannot be in a rigid game. 
For rigid games, we can relabel actions in a way that makes stationary
Markov perfect equilibria subgame-consistent.
Theorem 3 Given any rigid game, there exists an isomorphic game such that
every stationary Markov perfect equilibrium is subgame-consistent.
For games that are not rigid, a mere relabeling will not suffice. Here is a
trivial example with only one player:
1 1 11
The two proper subgames are clearly isomorphic, but no pure strategy can
make all isomorphic choices at the same time. Any isomorphism reproduces
the tree structure, including the payoff-irrelevant redundancies. There is
really no decision problem in this example. The example is nongeneric, but
this is natural in this context. The symmetries avoided by rigid games stem
from nongeneric payoff-ties.
Remark 2 If in game with only finitely many histories, there exists a player
who is not indifferent between any two plays, then the game is rigid.
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Proof: By assumption, there is a player i ∈ I whose preferences i over
plays are a linear ordering. Isomorphisms are completely determined by
what they do to plays. The identity on H is the only isomorphism to it-
sef that doesn’t change any plays. Now by (iii) in the definition of an iso-
morphism, the restriction of every isomorphism to the set of plays is an
order-isomorphism for i. The only order isomorphism of a finite, linearly
ordered set to itself is the identity. 
3.5 Discussion
The notion of subgame consistency used here is quite strong. In particular,
we assume that all isomorphisms induce behavior in corresponding sub-
games. This corresponds to the idea that an observer can hold any view
on how different subgames are related to each other. A different approach
would require that if two subgames are related by some isomorphism, there
exists some isomorphism that relates the behavior in one subgame to the be-
havior in another subgame. For elementary games, these notions coincide.
For other games, requiring this form of subgame-consistency would mean
that players have a shared understanding of what subgames are considered
to be the same. This requires them to have a more complex model of their
environment that is not just based on the structure of the game.
Satisfying our notion of subgame-consistency would be easier if players
could employ mixed strategies. Our notion does rule out certain pure equi-
libria even in one-shot games, where symmetric equilibria always exist in
mixed strategies as shown in (Nash, 1951). If one prefers to work with the
mixed extension, one replaces actions by behavior strategies, interpreted as
transition probabilities. To justify this, one appeals to a suitable extension of
Kuhn’s theorem, such as the one in Chapter 5. This will require additional
assumptions. The extension is relatively straightforward when only finitely
many players have nontrivial choices each period and after each nontermi-
nal history, a player can play at most countably many actions. In this case,
H∗ will be at most countable and every consistent partition profile will only
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include partitions with at most countably many cells. No special measur-
able or topological structure has to be imposed on the state space. Also, if
we start with a dynamic game defined in terms of a given countable state
space, we are guaranteed that our construction gives us less states (Propo-
sition 5.6.2. in (Mailath & Samuelson, 2006)), so for many applications,
there is no problem in admitting mixed strategies.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that one could separate all results from spe-
cific solution concepts such as SPE. Effectively, we have shown that one can
represent future strategic possibilities by summary statistics, states, and that
for rigid games, one can do this in a way that preserves symmetries in the
strategic possibilities. If we look at purely forward-looking forms of behav-
ior, states will contain all relevant information.
3.6 Appendix
The following proof builds on the original proof of Maskin and Tirole and
work of Ore on the lattice structure of partitions. The construction of the
coarsest consistent partition profile is based on a characterization of the
finest common coarsening of a family of partitions due to Ore. Partitions
of a set form a complete lattice with the “coarser than”-ordering and Ore
laid the foundations for the theory in (Ore, 1942). The reader interested
in partition lattices will find a comprehensive overview in (Grätzer, 2003),
section IV.4.
Proof of Theorem 1
We show that a coarsest consistent partition profile exists. Essentially the
same proof works for dated partition profiles. For each player i ∈ I, we
define a relation ≡i on H∗ such that h ≡i h ′ if there is a finite sequence of
nonterminal histories h,h1,h2, . . . ,hn,h ′ such that consecutive histories in
the sequence are equivalent for the partition of i in some consistent partition
profile Πi. The relation ≡i is clearly an equivalence relation. Let Π∗i be the
partition of H∗ into ≡i-equivalence classes.
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We will now show that (Π∗i )i∈I is the coarsest consistent partition profile. It
is clearly a partition profile and by construction coarser than any consistent
partition profile. It remains to verify that it is also consistent. We begin
with consistency condition (i). If h and h ′ are Π∗i -equivalent, they are also
≡i-equivalent and that means they are connected by a finite sequence of
nonterminal histories such that consecutive histories are equivalent under
some partition in a consistent partition profile. But then consecutive histo-
ries in the sequence must allow for the same continuations by (i) and by
transitivity, h and h ′ allow for the same continuations. This proves (i).
For consistency condition (ii), observe that the coarser a partition is, the less
strategies are measurable. That means that whenever all players j 6= i play
Πj-measurable strategies, they play strategies measurable with respect to
their partition in every consistent partition profile. Now suppose all players
j 6= i employ Π∗j -measurable strategies. Let h and h ′ be Π∗i -equivalent and
si|h hi s ′i|h with si|h1 = si|h2 and s ′i|h1 = s ′i|h2. Then there exists a finite
sequence h1, . . . ,hn+1 of nonterminal histories and a finite sequence of con-
sistent partition profiles (Π1i)i∈I, . . . , (Π
n
i )i∈I such that h1 = h, hn+1 = h
′
and hk,hk+1 are in the same cell of Πki for k = 1, . . . ,n. Now if all players
j 6= i employ Π∗j -measurable strategies, they also employ Πkj -measurable
strategies. Since all continuations are the same, we can modify si and
s ′i such that si|h
k = si|h and s ′i|h
k = s ′i|h for k = 1, . . . ,n. Hence,
si|h
k hki s ′i|hk for k = 1, . . . ,n. By transitivity of ≡i, consistency con-
dition (ii) holds. 
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof: Let
(
H, (i)i∈I
)
be a given game. We rename every action played at
a certain history so that actions played after different histories get different
names. Here is one way to do this: If a = (ai)i∈I is an action profile and
z some mathematical object, write a|z for
(
(ai, z)
)
i∈I. Set f(∅) = ∅. Now
suppose f(h) is already defined when h has length T −1. For a finite history
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h = (at)Tt=1 of length T , set
f(h) =
(
f
(
(at)T−1t=1
)
,aT |h
)
.
If h = (at)∞t=1 is an infinite history, let f(h) be the unique sequence such
that the initial segment of length T coincides with f
(
(at)Tt=1
)
for all T . Set
H ′ = f(H), which is a game form. Define ( ′i)i∈I on elements of f(H) of
maximal length by f(h)  ′i f(h ′) if and only if h i h ′ for every player i. It
is obvious that f is an isomorphism.
Since actions played after different histories are different, there are no
two histories inH ′ that have a common continuation. So the only stationary
consistent partition consists of all singletons and every strategy is measur-
able with respect to this partition. So every subgame perfect equilibrium
uses strategies measurable with respect to this partition and is therefore a
SMPE. 
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof: Let G = (I,H, (i)i∈I) be a rigid game. By transforming the game
as in the proof of Theorem 2, we can assume that no action can be played
after different histories. For each player i ∈ I we define a function gi on
Ai =
⋃
h∈H∗ Ai(h). By assumption, for each ai ∈ Ai there is a unique
history hai such that ai can be played after hai . Let (ai,a−i) be a profile
with
(
hai , (ai,a−i)
) ∈ H. Now we let gi(ai) be the set of all a ′i ∈ Ai
such that there is some h-subgame isomorphic to the hai-subgame with
isomorphism f : Hhai → Hh such that a ′i is the ith coordinate of the last
component of f
(
hai , (ai,a−i)
)
. Effectively, gi(ai) is the set of actions that
serve the same role as ai in some subgame.
We now construct a function g on H recursively. We set g(∅) = ∅. Sup-
pose g is already defined for all histories of length n−1 and h ′ =
(
h, (ai)i∈I
)
is a history of length n. Then we set g(h ′) =
(
g(h), (gi(ai))i∈I
)
. If h =
(at)∞t=1 is an infinite history, let g(h) be the unique sequence such that the
initial segment of length T coincides with g
(
(at)Tt=1
)
for all T . Clearly, g is
an injection.
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Now g(H) is a game form. Define ( ′i)i∈I on elements of g(H) of maxi-
mal length by g(h)  ′i g(h ′) if and only if h i h ′ for every player i. Then
G ′ = (I,g(H), ( ′i)i∈I) is a game isomorphic to G under the isomorphism
g : H → g(H). Moreover, any isomorphic subgames of G ′ actually coincide
by construction, so every SMPE of G ′ is necessarily subgame-consistent. 
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Chapter 4
Commitment in Extensive
Form Games
4.1 Introduction
It is a fundamental tenet of decision theory that having more options can
never hurt a decision maker. It also is a fundamental tenet of game theory
that other players knowing a player has more options can hurt a player.
Players often benefit from publicly getting rid of their options, an insight
that predates game theory proper by more than two thousand years in the
work of Sun Tzu:
At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like one who
has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder behind
him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory before he
shows his hand. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots;
like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this
way and that, and nothing knows whither he is going.
(Giles, 2010)
The idea that players can make strategic commitments to their benefit
was introduced to the world of game theory in (Schelling, 1960). Schelling
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convincingly argued that players often have no interest to carry out their
threats and promises when called to act on them, so that the ability to make
binding commitments can be crucial in making threats and promises work.
The insight that not every Nash equilibrium is self-enforcing from a dynamic
point of view was the starting point of developing extensive from refine-
ments such as sub-game perfection in (Selten, 1965).
In this paper, we take a look at an idealized world in which players can
costlessly make any commitments. We start with an extensive form game
and create a larger extensive form game that explicitly allows for all pos-
sible commitments. Commitments are modeled as a players ability to burn
her bridges. At each stage, she can arbitrarily restrict her future possible
choices. In the enlarged game, we study the sequential equilibria. We can-
not compare equilibria in the original and the enlarged game directly. But
by stripping plays in the extended game from all commitments made along
them, we can compare the distributions over plays.
After a brief survey of the related literature, a formal model of exten-
sive form games is given. The formal definition does matter, because we
construct the commitment version of an extensive game explicitly in terms
of the underlying game in the following section. After that, commitment
outcomes are defined and it is shown that every distribution over plays in-
duced by a pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a commitment outcome. This
is followed by a number of examples some remarks and then a concluding
discussion.
4.2 Literature
The literature on commitment in which commitment is modeled in a general
framework focuses mostly on static, one-shot games. (Tennenholtz, 2004),
(Kalai et al., 2010), and (Peters & Szentes, 2012) allow for commitment
devices that condition on each other and are effective without any delay.
The main results of all these papers are folk theorems to the effect that
every individually rational payoff can be implemented with commitments.
(Hamilton & Slutsky, 1993) , (van Damme & Hurkens, 1996) take a
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one-shot game and analyze what happens when the ordering of move gets
changed. (Bade et al., 2009), and (Renou, 2009) embed a one-shot game in
dynamic games in which players can dispose of some actions. In (Caruana &
Einav, 2008), players can announce over several periods what actions they
will take in a one-shot game played at the end. The last message is binding
and changing messages becomes increasingly costly, so talk is not cheap.
Among these papers, the one by (Renou, 2009) is most closely related to
the present work. A one-shot game gets extended to a two-stage game in
which players can first choose subsets of their strategy spaces and then play
the game with their chosen reduced strategy spaces. Then, the sub-game
perfect equilibria of the extended game are analyzed. Our framework can
be seen as a generalization of this approach that allows for explicit dynamics
and the results and examples in (Renou, 2009) are of direct relevance to our
framework.
4.3 Environment
There is a finite set of players I and, by slight abuse of notation, we will also
denote the number of players by I. There exists a set of finite sequences of
I-tuples H, the histories. A history is meant to capture what has happened
in a game up to a certain period. The set H includes the empty history ∅,
which we view as the origin of a tree. A history that is of maximal length is
a play. A history that is not a play is a nonterminal history, and this is where
players make their choices.
Every player i ∈ I has a finite-valued choice correspondence Ci defined
on histories. Choices shouldn’t be thought of as actions, each choice incor-
porates an action and how informed the player taking it. See H3 below and
the discussion of H3. The correspondence may be empty-valued at some his-
tories. We write C for the Cartesian product of all choice correspondences.
That is, C(h) =
∏I
i=1Ci(h). We make the following assumptions:
H1 H is the smallest set that includes the empty sequence ∅ such that if
h ∈ H and c ∈ C(h), then (h, c) ∈ H.
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H2 If h is a history and C(h) = ∅, then Ci(h) = ∅ for all i ∈ I.
H3 If Ci(h) ∩ Ci(h ′) 6= ∅ for some histories h and h ′ and some player
i ∈ I, then Ci(h ′) = Ci(h).
H4 There exists a number n, such that no history is longer than n.
H5 If the histories h and h ′ have different length, then Ci(h) 6= Ci(h ′) for
every player i ∈ I.
Assumption H1 allows us to construct the tree-structure of the game from
the choice correspondences. Conversely, assumption H2 ensures that we can
recover all choice correspondences from H. In particular, Ci(h) is the set of
choices ci such that (h, (ci, c−i)) ∈ H for some c−i. Assumption H2 allows
us to use the histories as basic objects, and treat the choice correspondences
as a derived object.
Assumption H3 ensures what is usually ensured by information sets. If
a choice is available after different histories, the player must not be able
to differentiate between the histories on the basis of the choices she faces
at them. One can recover information sets in the usual sense from choice
correspondences. The information sets of player i ∈ I are maximal sets of
non-terminal histories on which Ci is constant and nonempty-valued.
Assumption H4 ensures that the game has a finite horizon. Finally, as-
sumption H5 ensures that every player is aware of the calendar time, which
is, at least in the setting of finite games, the most restrictive assumption we
make. At least in games of perfect recall, every player has a subjective no-
tion of time. Along any play, information sets are linearly ordered. But this
notion of time will in general differ from player to player (see (Ritzberger,
1999)). Since we want to model a players ability to make commitments
at every round, rounds should be meaningful in our framework, and H5
guarantees just that.
It should be noted that extensive forms as defined here allow for simul-
taneous choices to be represented as truly simultaneous. The small cost this
brings is that we have to introduce dummy choices, that is, a player may
not have two choices available at an information set and thus no choice in
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the true sense of the word. We call choice situations in which a player has
at least two choices available proper choices and interpret players without
proper choices as inactive.
To tie everything up, we endow every player i ∈ I with a real-valued
payoff-function ui defined on plays. We call the whole list (I,H, (ui)) a
game.
A pure strategy for player i ∈ I specifies for every choice situation Ci(h)
she faces a choice c ∈ Ci(h). Formally, a pure strategy si is a set that contains
exactly one element from each set in
{
Ci(h) : h ∈ H
}
\{∅}. A behavior
strategy consists of a probability distribution over each set in
{
Ci(h) : h ∈
H
}
\{∅}. If we want to incorporate moves of nature, we declare one player
to be nature and fix a behavior strategy for her. We say that player i ∈ I
satisfies perfect recall if the following two conditions are satisfied:
R1 If two non-terminal histories h and h ′ have initial segments of the
same length hn and h ′n such that Ci(hn) 6= Ci(h ′n), then Ci(h) 6=
Ci(h
′).
R2 If two non-terminal histories h and h ′ differ in some period in the
choice of i, then Ci(h) 6= Ci(h ′).
R1 expresses that player i never forgets what she knew and R2 that she
never forgets what she did. The game (I,H, (ui)) satisfies perfect recall if
every i ∈ I satisfies perfect recall. In analyzing games with perfect recall, we
can restrict players to using behavior strategies instead of mixtures of pure
strategies without loss of generality by Kuhn’s theorem. That the notion
of perfect recall used here coincides with the usual one, follows from the
arguments in (Ritzberger, 1999).
A particularly simple class of games are games with observable actions.
The game (I,H, (ui)) has observable actions if for all histories h,h ′ ∈ H and
all players i ∈ I, one has Ci(h) = Ci(h ′) implies that h = h ′ or Ci(h) = ∅.
In words, no player faces the same choices after different histories. After a
player makes a choice, it becomes known to everybody. It is immediate that
a game with observable actions satisfies perfect recall.
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4.4 Modeling Commitment
Our fundamental approach to commitment is that a player can dispose of
choices available to her. Let Ci be the choice-correspondence of i ∈ I. We
call a correspondence C ′i a contraction of Ci, if the following two conditions
hold.
C1 For every history h, C ′i(h) ⊆ Ci(h).
C2 If Ci(h) 6= ∅ then C ′i(h) 6= ∅.
Condition C2 means that no player can “leave the game.” This condition
ensures that the set of plays remains essentially the same when we allow for
commitments and allows us to compare outcomes with and without com-
mitments.
For each game G, we construct a commitment version C(G). In order to
construct the set of histories HC, it suffices by H2 to construct all finite his-
tories. We can partition the set of finite histories according to their length
and let HCn denote the set of histories with length n. Moreover we can build
up the choice correspondences CCi from their restrictions C
C
i,n = C
C
i |H
C
n .
We construct both the finite histories and the restrictions of the choice cor-
respondences recursively. Note that by H1, HCn is determined by H
C
n−1 and
CCn−1. Moreover, for each history h in H
C
n−1 let pi(h) be the projection to
the corresponding history in the original game. That is, pi(h) strips h of all
commitments. We could define pi formally by adding a further recursion.
We let HC0 contain the empty sequence alone and for every player i ∈ I,
we let
CCi,0(∅) =
{(
c,C(0)i
)
: C
(0)
i is a contraction of Ci and c ∈ Ci(∅)
}
.
That is, initially, a player can reduce her strategic possibilities and make
an arbitrary choice. Suppose now that both HCn−1 and C
C
i,n−1 have been
constructed for all i. Now
HCn =
{(
h, c
)
: h ∈ HCn−1, c ∈ CCn−1(h)
}
,
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with CCn−1 being the Cartesian product of all the C
C
i,n−1. Let C
(n)
i be the
contraction chosen in the last choice played by i ∈ I in h ∈ HCn . For every
player i ∈ I and h ∈ HCn , let
CCi,n(h) =
{{(
c,C(n)i
)}
× P(h) : C(n)i is a contraction of C(n−1)i
and c ∈ C(n−1)i
(
pi(h)
)}
,
with P(h) being the public history of commitments made in history h. The
function P can be defined recursively too. We have to take the Cartesian
product, so that players can make their choices conditional on what com-
mitments have been made already.
For the definition of C(G), we also have to define payoffs. If h and h ′ are
plays in HC and i ∈ I is any player, we let uCi (h) = ui
(
pi(h ′)
)
. So players
do not care about commitment moves in themselves, they only care about
them instrumentally. This actually defines a game and everything is well
defined:
Proposition 1 The commitment version of a game with perfect recall is a game
with perfect recall too. Moreover, pi maps plays in HC onto the set of plays in
H.
Proof: This is essentially a straightforward verification. We show that C(G)
satisfies perfect recall if G does, the rest is even more straightforward. To
see that R1 holds, consider two different non-terminal histories h and h ′ in
C(G) that have initial segments hn and h ′n of the same length n such that
CCi (hn) 6= Ci(h ′n)C. By H3, CCi (hn) ∩ Ci(h ′n)C = ∅. So h and h ′ differ ei-
ther in the last coordinate in pi(hn+1) and pi(h ′n+1) or P(hn+1) and P(h
′
n+1)
are different. In the first case, CCi (h) 6= CCi (h ′) follows from the fact that
G satisfies R2, in the second case, it holds by construction. Similarly, one
verifies R2 from the fact that different choices of i ∈ I in two nonterminal
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histories h and h ′ can only occur if pi(h) 6= pi(h ′) or P(h) 6= P(h). 
In this framework, the first commitment and the first choice are made con-
currently by each player. But this is without loss of generality. If one wants
to allow players to make commitments before the actual game starts, one
simply introduces a dummy round in which no player has a proper choice.
It should be noted that, formally, we do not allow for making commit-
ments to behavior strategies. It is not entirely obvious how one could com-
mit to a randomized strategy. The only verifiable way seems to be to con-
dition on an external randomization device. But this amounts to commiting
to a pure strategy that depends on moves of nature. This is allowed in our
framework, but needs explicit modeling. However, the finiteness assump-
tion guarantees that, at least in any game with a non-trivial extensive form,
there always exists behavior strategies that cannot be interpreted this way.
A way of modeling even more commitments would be to allow players
to reduce their payoff at some plays at each stage. Getting rid of an action
could then be modeled as reducing the payoff for all plays compatible with a
certain action being played so that it becomes worse than the worst possible
play in the original game.
4.5 Commitment Outcomes
A strategy profile for the commitment version does not necessarily induce a
strategy profile for the original game. The problem is that players can condi-
tion their "ordinary choices" on the contractions chosen before, an option not
available in the original game. We therefore define our equilibrium notion
in terms of outcomes, the plays: Given the game G, a commitment outcome
of G is the distribution over plays induced by a sequential equilibrium1 of
C(G) under pi. The first result shows that commitments do indeed make
1A sequential equilibrium is usually defined as a behavior strategy profile and a system
of conditional beliefs that are derived as the induced limit beliefs from a sequence of com-
pletely mixed behavior strategy profiles converging to the given profile. Clearly, all relevant
information is contained in this sequence and we call this sequence itself a sequential equi-
librium.
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all pure strategy Nash equilibria feasible. It generalizes the corresponding
result by (Renou, 2009) for static games.
Theorem 1 Let G be a game and h∗ be induced by a pure strategy Nash equi-
librium. Then h∗ is a commitment outcome of G.
Proof: Let (si)i∈I be a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Let (bni )i∈I →
(bi)i∈I be an arbitrary sequential equilibrium of C(G). Such an equilib-
rium always exists. For each i ∈ I, let ci be the choice after history ∅ that
consists of the choice si makes in Ci(∅) and the contraction C(0)i that re-
duces the choice correspondence to the at most single-valued correspon-
dence that agrees with si. Let b ′i be the behavioral strategy hat carries
this choice out with probability one and agrees with bi everywhere else.
Construct a new sequence of behavioral strategies (bn∗i ) such that b
n∗
i =
1/nbni + (n − 1)/nb
′
i. Clearly, this sequence converges to b
′
i. Moreover,
conditional beliefs off the equilibrium path induced by (si) agree with those
induced by bni along the sequence. We verify that this is a sequential equi-
librium. For this, we use the one deviation property of sequential rationality
(see Exercise 227.1 in (Osborne & Rubinstein, 1994) or (Hendon et al.,
1996)).
Off the equilibrium path, no player has a reason to ever deviate, since
b ′i and bi agree there. On the equilibrium path, players can never deviate
after the first round since they have committed themselves to playing ac-
cording to (si). In the first round, no player has a reason to deviate, since
their strategies come from a Nash equilibrium and are therefore ex-ante
optimal. 
It should be noted that we made implicitly much use of commitments being
costless. If every other player j 6= i commits to their strategy sj, player
i ∈ I has no reason to follow and would not do so if there were any cost
associated with making a commitment.
It is generally much easier to work with sub-game perfect equilibria instead
of sequential equilibria. The two equilibrium concepts agree on games with
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observable actions, since nonterminal histories correspond to both informa-
tion sets and sub-games in such a game. So the following simple observation
will be quite useful.
Proposition 2 Let G = (I,H, (ui)) be a game with observable actions. Then
C(G) has observable actions too.
Proof: Let h and h ′ be two different nonterminal histories in HC. Then
either pi(h) 6= pi(h) or P(h) 6= P(h). In both cases, CCi (h) 6= CCi (h ′) for all
i ∈ I. 
4.6 Examples
A straightforward consequence of Theorem 1 is that the ability to commit
may not be to the benefit of any player. The following common interest
game has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium giving both players a pay-
off of 3, yet has a Nash equilibrium giving both players a mere 2.
1
2
(3, 3) (1, 1) (2, 2)
RL
l r
The example also shows that Theorem 1 does not hold without the im-
plicit assumption of costless commitments. If commitments are costly, at
least one player will not commit initially to a pure strategy. If all others
commit to a pure strategy, her decision problem is unaffected. Now a player
committing to a strategy will only do so if she is better off with the commit-
ment when commitments are costly. In the example, both players are worse
off under commitment, so no player will make an initial commitment.
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Not every commitment solution is induced by a Nash equilibrium. An
interesting example is given by the centipede game of (Rosenthal, 1981).
We use a slightly shortened version with the following extensive form (for
simplicity, actions are not labeled; they are ‘down’ and ‘pass’):
1
(0, 0)
2
(−1, 3)
1
(2, 2)
2
(1, 5)
1
(4, 4)
2
(3, 7)
(6, 6)
There is a unique play induced by every Nash equilibrium and that is the
play in which player 1 plays down immediately.2 The play in which no
player plays down is, however, a commitment solution, supported by the
following reasoning. Suppose player 2 makes no initial commitment. Then
player 1 can ensure a payoff of 0 by playing down. But even better, she
can pass and commit to pass again the next time she is to move, which will
compel player two to pass too to get a payoff of at least 5 instead of 2. In
this situation, player 2 can either get a payoff of 5 or simultaneously pass
and commit. Since player 1 will then pass to get a payoff of 6 instead of 3,
player two gains from the commitment.
Theorem 1 showed that every pure strategy Nash equilibrium induces a
commitment outcome. The proof relied crucially on strategies being pure.
It is not possible to fully commit to mixed strategies, since mixtures require
some choice being left open. Indeed the result fails for mixed strategy Nash
equilibria, as the following example shows (this was already observed in
(Renou, 2009), who provides a different example). The game consists of a
dummy round without proper choices after which two players play Battle of
the Sexes:
(2, 1) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (1, 2)
2Given any longer play, the last player that passed on playing down with positive proba-
bility has a profitable deviation.
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Besides the two pure strategy equilibria, the game has a single nondegener-
ate mixed strategy equilibrium in which the row player plays the first row
with a probability of 2/3 and the column player plays the second column
with a probability of 2/3. In this equilibrium, both players obtain a payoff
of 2/3. This cannot be a commitment outcome. In order for the mixed strat-
egy equilibrium to be feasible, players must not rule out any choice in the
first round. But there is a profitable deviation in this case. The row player
can get rid of the second row. In the resulting sub-game, the column player
will then choose the first column for sure and this gives the row player a
higher payoff of 2.
Making a commitment in our framework achieves actually two things.
A player reduces her choices and announces a credible message that she
did so. These messages allow players to implement a form of cheap talk.
Consider the following game:
1
(2, 2) (0, 0)
(0, 0) (2, 2)
(−9,−9)
(−9,−9)
Player 1 will never move right initially and the right sub-game seems to be
strategically irrelevant. This is actually not so. Player 1 can randomly rule
out strategies in the right sub-game and use this to coordinate behavior in
the left sub-game. So every correlated equilibrium of the pure coordination
game on the left becomes feasible. The public randomization here is fully
controlled by player 1. But it is actually possible to do something similar in
a framework in which players would have an incentive to manipulate public
randomization if they could. Consider the following three player game,
which might be seen as a three player version of Battle of sexes: There are
three friends 1,2, and 3 who can meet at three possible places 1,2, and 3.
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A player who ends up alone at one place gets a payoff of 0. If at least two
players meet at one of the places, they get a payoff of at least 2. The player
who ends up with a friend at her place (1 at 1, 2 at 2, 3 at 3) gets a payoff
of 3. The game has an efficient, symmetric correlated equilibrium in which
all players meet at each of these places with a probability of 1/3. Every
player would like to be able to manipulate the correlation device that has
to be used. But this outcome is implementable as a commitment outcome
in a game in which, similarly to the way before, an "irrelevant" sub-game
exists in which player 1 and 2 have three choices, which we might denote
simply by 1, 2, and 3. Initially, player 1 and 2 can implicitly send messages
1, 2, and 3. There is a sequential equilibrium in the commitment version
in which player 1 and 2 choose each of the three messages with probability
1/3. If m1 and m2 are the random messages of player 1 and 2, then all
players meet at the place m1 +m2 mod 3. Neither player 1 nor player 2
can effect the value of m1 +m2 mod 3 by changing the distribution of her
messages. Also, no player has an incentive to make further commitments.
A similar approach allows us to extend a game in seemingly irrelevant
ways to allow for any form of public correlation with a distribution with
rational values. The construction is similar to various approaches to con-
struct jointly controlled lotteries from the cheap talk literature, as in (Forges,
1990). The mathematical tool to use is the following simple fact:
Proposition 3 Let f and g be independent random variables with values in
the set S = {1, 2, . . . ,n} and assume that f is uniformly distributed on S. Then
f+ g mod n is uniformly distributed.
Proof: Let pfm = 1/n and p
g
m be the probability of f and g taking the value
m, respectively. For each m and k ∈ S there is a unique lm(k) ∈ S such that
k+ lm(k) mod n is m. So
n∑
k=1
p
g
kp
f
lm(k)
=
n∑
k=1
p
g
k1/n = 1/n
n∑
k=1
p
g
k = 1/n
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is the total probability of choosing m under µ+ ν mod n. 
So far, all our examples were games with observable actions. The following
extremely simple example shows how commitments can help in avoiding
moral hazard problems. A producer (P) can produce a high quality or a low
quality product. Quality is costless. There is a customer (C) who can then
buy the product or not, but does not know the quality. The game tree should
be rather clear:
P
CC
(2, 2) (-2,0) (3,-1) (-1,-0)
high quality low quality
buy don’tdon’t buy
Clearly, there is a unique Nash equilibrium in which low quality is produced
and then not sold. Moreover, producing low quality is strictly dominant
for the producer. But with an initial commitment round, the producer can
commit to producing high quality and then actually sell it.
4.7 Discussion
We have modeled commitment by the ability to dispose of choices. An ad-
vantage of this approach is that the ultimate behavior in the commitment ex-
tension can be compared to behavior in the underlying game. Commitments
are not contracts that can incorporate an automatic reaction to other con-
tracts as in (Tennenholtz, 2004), (Kalai et al., 2010), and (Peters & Szentes,
2012). To react to a commitment, a player has to react with her strategy
to the observation of the commitment of other players. As a result, com-
mitment solutions can be much smaller than equilibrium notions in which
contracts can directly condition on other contracts. The latter approach
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means implicitly that there is no temporal gap between reactions, players
are patient enough not to care about the gap between observing another
contract and reacting to it. As such, it is not surprising that it allows for a
folk theorem and using commitment outcomes does not.
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Chapter 5
Strategic Stochastic Processes
with Klaus Ritzberger
5.1 Introduction
An extensive form is meant to tell us who can do what, when, and knowing
what. It specifies the rules of the game and should provide us with a com-
plete map of the strategic environment. The theory of extensive forms, a
kind of strategic cartography, needs a theory of choices, a theory of timing,
and a theory of information and knowledge. In a purely deterministic frame-
work, we have an essentially complete theory of extensive forms, developed
by Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger in (Alós-Ferrer & Ritzberger,
2005) and (Alós-Ferrer & Ritzberger, 2008). See also (Alós-Ferrer et al.,
2011).
But game theory has always been closely related to probability. When
Pascal and Fermat lay the foundations for a mathematical treatment of prob-
ability at the end of the 17th century, they did so to understand the odds in
games of dice (see for example (Hacking, 2006)). The success of game
theory is not imaginable without the concept of a mixed strategy and a deci-
sion theory powerful enough to deal with risk. This paper is a step towards
building an adequate theory of extensive forms that incorporates strategic
randomization.
The building blocks of a mathematical treatment of probability in finite
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or countably infinite games are straightforward and of a combinatorial na-
ture. The elementary theory of discrete probability suffices. In this paper, we
go beyond discrete probability and establish a framework for the treatment
of probability in extensive forms based on measure theoretic probability.
We do this with a minimum of structure, we avoid topological and quasi-
topological regularity assumptions where possible. This gives us deeper in-
sights on what it is that we really need to make extensive form analysis work
outside the deterministic framework.
Game theory provides us with peculiar challenges in probabilistic mod-
eling. Everything is based on counterfactuals. We cannot look only at the
actual distribution of what happens along plays, we have to look at what
could happen if some player changes her behavior. What is a null set will
depend on the strategies chosen by other players, so a player must not ig-
nore null sets. This rules out some of the most powerful tools measure
theoretic probability theory has to offer.
In our framework, probability is countably additive. Savage’s axiomati-
zation of subjective expected utility in (Savage, 1972) provides us only with
foundations for finitely-additive probabilities. But finitely additive probabil-
ities lead to absurd conclusions in strategic settings. Consider the following
simple zero-sum game, first introduced in (Wald, 1945):
Example 1 Ann and Bob simultaneously choose a natural number. If both
choose the same number, the game ends in a draw. Otherwise, the player who
has chosen the larger number wins. It is easy to see that the game has no Nash
equilibrium in countably additive mixed strategies. But there is an equilibrium
in finitely additive strategies. Both players choose a mixed strategy that puts
no mass on any single number and therefore puts no mass on any finite set.
So for each number Bob can choose, the probability of Ann choosing a larger
number is 1 and she wins for sure! But the game is symmetric, and the same
reasoning can be used to show that Bob would win for sure. The problem is
that the order in which we evaluate probabilities does matter in the finitely
additive case. Fubini’s theorem fails, the order of iterated integrals matters.
Our approach is classical. We treat randomization as objective random-
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ization. Players throw dice and coins and spin roulette wheels. It might be
possible to interpret our results epistemologically, but we will not pursue
such an approach. Also, we will treat everything in terms of an objective
outside observer. For simplicity, we only study games satisfying perfect re-
call and in which players are aware of calender time, a case that turns out
to be challenging enough.
Here is a brief outline of what we do: We start with a brief literature review.
We then discuss how we model information and knowledge. This is followed
by a discussion of how we model strategies and we show how strategies ac-
tually induce outcomes. We then discuss when Kuhn’s theorem holds in our
framework. That is, when can a player replace mixed strategies by behavior
strategies. It fails without further assumptions, there are mixed strategies
that cannot be replaced by behavior strategies. We then give sufficient con-
ditions for Kuhn’s theorem to hold. Two appendices provide mathematical
background information and clarify notation and terminology. It might be a
good idea to browse the appendices first. For the issues we discuss, we need
not specify any preferences or payoffs.
A small remark on terminology is in order: Every result that is not original
is categorized as a lemma in this paper. This should not be taken as a sign
of it being a minor result.
5.2 Literature
The foundations of a usable theory of randomization in extensive form
games were given by Harold Kuhn in (Kuhn, 1950) and (Kuhn, 1953). Kuhn
showed that in finite extensive form games, behavior strategies are as pow-
erful as mixed strategies if and only if the game satisfies perfect recall. More
precisely, for every mixed strategy of a player, there is a behavior strat-
egy such that both strategies induce the same outcome for every profile of
strategies for the other players. This important fact is now known as Kuhn’s
theorem. Often the term is applied to the sufficiency side only, a path we
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follow here. Kuhn’s theorem allows us to analyze randomization in exten-
sive forms with strategy spaces of much smaller dimension. Also, behavior
strategies are usually much easier to interpret.
In the extensive forms Kuhn considered, no play can go through the
same information set twice and in such games, mixed strategies are always
at least as powerful as behavior strategies. It was then shown by John Isbell
in (Isbell, 1957) that, in a sufficiently general framework, mixed strategies
are as least as powerful as behavior strategies if and only if no play passes
twice through the same information set.
A version of Kuhn’s theorem for games in which players have a contin-
uum of actions available was given by Robert Aumann in (Aumann, 1964).
Aumann showed, in his framework, that if a player has perfect recall, that
player can restrict herself to using behavior strategies. Aumann’s paper
made it obvious that Kuhn’s theorem was essentially about existence of con-
ditional probabilities. The paper contains essentially the blueprint for all
proofs of Kuhn’s theorem. Aumann also pointed out problems with a naive
approach to modeling mixed strategies and gave an alternative approach
that we will discuss and take up in section 5.5. In spite of the great advances
Aumann made, the paper had some serious weaknesses. In particular, only
the problem of one player was actually modeled and randomization of other
players couldn’t be explicitly modeled. Outcomes were deterministic func-
tions of the choices of the player and the profile of other players. A par-
tial converse to Aumann’s result was given by Gideon Schwarz in (Schwarz,
1974). Schwarz showed that under an additional measurability assumption,
perfect recall is necessary for behavior strategies being as least as powerful
as mixed strategies.
The approach of Aumann was extended to a workable framework in
a series of exercises in (Mertens et al., 1994). In particular, the behavior
of other players was explicitly modeled and the result covers most needs of
applied game theory. Our treatment follows a diffrent approach to modeling
information and makes use of stronger results on probabilitstic conditioning.
It is worth pointing out that the problem of randomized decisions is not
confined to game theory. Similar problems have been discussed quite early
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in statistical decision theory, starting with (Wald & Wolfowitz, 1951), and
in dynamic programming and gambling theory. See in particular (Maitra &
Sudderth, 2000) and the references therein.
This paper differs from previous papers addressing similar questions by
employing a new framework for modeling information and knowledge, al-
lowing for a countable number of players, and by weakening the common
assumption that action spaces are standard Borel.
5.3 Information
The canonical approach to modeling information and knowledge in finite
games is based on partitions. But partitions do not provide us with sufficient
foundations for general probabilistic settings. The domain of a probability
measure is a σ-algebra and partitions do not come with natural σ-algebras.
The naive approach of taking the σ-algebra generated by a partition as its
informational content leads to absurd conclusions as the following example
from (Billingsley, 1995) (Example 33.11) and (Dubra & Echenique, 2004)
shows:
Example 2 Consider the unit interval [0, 1]. Nature draws a number using
the uniform distribution µ. A player observes the drawn number perfectly, her
information partition is the partition into singletons. The σ-algebra S gener-
ated by this partition consists of the subsets of [0, 1] that are either countable
or have a countable complement. Our player can choose a number in [0, 1] her-
self, conditional on her σ-algebra. Her strategy is a function f : [0, 1] → [0, 1]
measurable with respect to S.
No matter what strategy the player chooses, it will equal a constant function
almost surely. This is easily shown. For each positive n, there is a closed subin-
terval of [0, 1] with length at most 1/n and probability 1 under the distribution
µ|S ◦ f−1. Pick such an interval for each n. Their intersection contains a single
point r, so
µ|S ◦ f−1{r} = µ ◦ f−1{r} = 1.
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Instead of trying to derive σ-algebras from partitions, we will start with
σ-algebras and derive partitions. We still want to be able to work with
partitions, since they are easy to interpret. If S is a σ-algebra on a set S,
there is a natural partition into sets of the form⋂{
A ∈ S : x ∈ A} for some x ∈ S.
We denote this partition by A(S) and call its elements atoms. This definition
is slightly unconventional. Atoms are commonly defined as measurable sets
that have no proper nonempty measurable subsets. This agrees with our
definition when the atoms in our sense are measurable. The partition into
atoms is exactly the partition into elements that cannot be separated by
measurable sets. No sensible form of reasoning allows a player to draw
distinctions between elements that are finer than what the partition into
atoms provides.
Atoms may fail to be measurable. Consider an uncountable product
{0, 1}κ endowed with the product σ-algebra. The atoms are the singletons,
but they are not measurable since a measurable set in the product σ-algebra
is determined by only countably many coordinates. However, all atoms are
measurable when S is countably generated.1
Given a probability measure µ on (S, S), we want to derive a probability
measure on A(S). For this we need to endow A(S) with a σ-algebra first.
Let pi : S → A(S) be the projection that maps each x ∈ S to the unique
P ∈ A(S) such that x ∈ P. We endow A(S) with the finest σ-algebra that
makes pi measurable and denote this σ-algebra by ΣS. We can think of ΣS
as generated by taking a measurable set and contracting its atoms to points.
We will use the following lemma a lot:
Lemma 1 Let (S, S) be a measurable space. Then pi : S → A(S) is bimeasur-
able and
S = {pi−1(B) : B ∈ ΣS}.
1Let C be a countable, nonempty family generating S, We can assume without loss of
generality that C is closed under complements. Then every atom is of the form
⋂
{A ∈ C :
x ∈ A} for some x ∈ S.
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Proof: We already know that pi is measurable. By construction,
ΣS =
{
B ⊆ A(S) : pi−1(B) ∈ S} = {B ⊆ A(S) :⋃B ∈ S}.
Let A ∈ S. We have
A =
⋃
s∈A
pi(s) =
⋃
pi(A) = pi−1
(
pi(A)
)
,
since A is the union of atoms contained in it. This shows that pi(A) ∈ ΣS
and that we can reconstruct S from ΣS. 
As a corollary, we obtain the following universal property:
Corollary 1 Let (T ,T) be a measurable space. A function f : A(S) → T is
measurable if and only if f ◦ pi is measurable.
Proof: Necessity is obvious. So let f ◦ pi be measurable and B ∈ T. Then
pi(pi−1 ◦ f−1(B)) = f−1(B) ∈ ΣS. 
The following lemma shows that ΣS has a very simple structure, which is
usually not shared by other quotient constructions:
Lemma 2 Let (S, S) be a measurable space and let C be a choice set for A(S).
That is C ⊆ S and C ∩ P contains exactly one element for each P ∈ A(S).
Endow C with the trace σ-algebra C ∩ S. Then the restriction pi|C : C→ A(S)
is an isomorphism.
Proof: By construction, pi|C is bijective. We have (pi|C)−1(B) = pi−1(B) ∩ C
for all B ∈ ΣS, so pi|C is measurable. Also, pi|C(A ∩ C) = pi(A) for all A ∈ S,
so pi|C is bimeasurable. 
Since the trace σ-algebra of a countably generated σ-algebra is countably
generated, it follows from this lemma that ΣS is countably generated when
S is. This proof requires of course the existence of a choice set C, which
is ensured by the axiom of choice. We also give a more constructive, but
longer proof of this fact:
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Corollary 2 If S is countably generated, then ΣS is countably generated too.
Proof: Since S is countably generated, there is a function f : S→ [0, 1] such
that S = σ(f). The trace σ-algebra f(S) ∩ B on f(S) is clearly countably
generated. Since B separates points, the level sets of f are exactly the atoms
of S. We can therefore construct a bijection g : f(S) → A(S) such that
g(t) = f−1({t}) for all t ∈ f(S). We are done when we can show that g is an
isomorphism. We have g ◦ f = pi, so the following diagram commutes:
S A(S)
f(S)
pi
f g
To see that the forward image of a measurable set under g is measurable, let
B ∈ f(S) ∩B.We have f−1(B) ∈ S and since pi is bimeasurable, pi(f−1(B)) =
g(B) ∈ ΣS.
We now show that the forward image of a measurable set under f is
measurable. Let A ∈ S. Since S = σ(f) and taking the trace on the range
of f doesn’t change this, there is B ∈ f(S) ∩ B such that A = f−1(B). Since
f : S→ f(S) is surjective, B = f(f−1(B)) = f(A) ∈ f(S) ∩B. To see now that
g is measurable, let C ∈ ΣS. Then f
(
pi−1(C)
)
= g−1(C) ∈ f(S) ∩B. 
A consequence of the proof is that
(
A(S),ΣS
)
can be identified with a subset
of [0, 1] with the trace σ-algebra. The next lemma points to an important
structural property of our construction:
Lemma 3 Let (S, S) and (T ,T) be countably generated measurable spaces and
f : S → T be a measurable function. Let piS : S → A(S) and piT : T → A(T)
be the canonical projections. Then there is a unique measurable function pi(f) :
A(S)→ A(T) such that the diagram
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S T
A(S) A(T)
f
pi(f)
piS piT
commutes. Moreover, pi(f) is bimeasurable if f is.
Proof: Clearly, there is a unique function that maps each piS(s) to piT
(
f(s)
)
.
It is measurable, since for all B ∈ ΣT,
pi(f)−1(B) = piS
(
f−1 ◦ pi−1T (B)
)
and piS is bimeasurable. Now let A ∈ ΣS and assume that f is bimeasurable.
Then
pi(f)(A) = piT
(
f
(
pi−1S (A)
))
,
which is in ΣT since piT and f are bimeasurable. 
From the categorial point of view, it follows from Lemma 3 that there is an
endofunctor pi in the category of measurable spaces and measurable func-
tions. By Corollary 2, it is also an endofunctor in the subcategory of count-
ably generated measurable spaces and measurable functions.
In an extensive form, players can learn over time. The increase in informa-
tion over time can be modeled as a sequence of finer and finer σ-algebras,
a filtration. Let (S0, S1, . . .) be a sequence of σ-algebras on the same under-
lying set S such that Sn ⊆ Sn+1 for all n. It is easily seen that every cell in
A(Sn) is the union of cells in A(Sn+1). We can therefore define projections
pimn : A(Sn) → A(Sm) for m 6 n such that pimn maps a cell P ∈ A(Sn) to
the unique cell in A(Sm) that contains P as a subset. Let pin : S→ A(Sn) be
the usual projection for each n.
A(S0) A(S1) A(S2) . . .
pi01 pi12 pi23
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Lemma 4 The family (A(Sn),ΣSn) and the projections (pimn)m6n form a
projective system. That is:
(i) The mappings (pimn)m6n are all measurable.
(ii) For all n, pinn is the identity on A(Sn).
(iii) For all l 6 m 6 n, we have piln = pilm ◦ pimn.
Moreover, If m 6 n, then pim = pimn ◦ pin.
Proof: Only (i) is not straightforward. Since pim = pimn ◦ pin, we have
pi−1m (A) = pi
−1
n ◦ pi−1mn(A) ∈ Sm ⊆ Sn for all A ∈ ΣSm . Since pin is surjective
and bimeasurable, pi
(
pi−1n ◦ pi−1mn(A)
)
= pi−1mn(A) ∈ ΣSn . 
Define a set P by
P =
{
(x0, x1, x2, . . .) ∈
∞∏
n=0
A(Sn) : m 6 n implies xm = pimn(xn)
}
.
P is known as the projective limit2 of the projective system above. Its ele-
ments satisfy the restriction that a cell in a coordinate must be a subset of
the cell before. We can also write the projective limit as
P =
{(
pi0(s),pi1(s), . . .
)
: s ∈ S
}
,
the two formulations are easily seen to be equivalent. We can therefore think
of the elements of P as paths of learning. The family of initial segments of
elements of P forms a tree. Let pm :
∏
nA(Sn)→ A(Sm) be the projection
onto the mth factor for all m. The embedding of P in a product allows us
to employ mathematical tools developed for product spaces. For this, we
have to verify that P is actually in
⊗
n ΣSn . This will be the case when Sn is
countably generated for every n.
2Another term often used is inverse limit. Projective systems become then inverse systems.
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A(S0) A(S1) A(S2) . . .
P
pi01 pi12 pi23
p0 p1 p2 . . .
Lemma 5 P is a measurable subset of
∏
nA(Sn) if Sn is countably generated
for all n.
Proof: Let Gmn be the graph of pi : A(Sn)→ A(Sm). Since ΣSm is countably
generated and separates points of A(Sm), the graph Gmn is a measurable
subset of A(Sn)⊗A(Sm). So G ′mn = {(y, x) : (x,y) ∈ Gmn} is a measurable
subset of A(Sm)⊗A(Sn). Now let
Xn =
n−1∏
k=0
A(Sk)×G ′n,n+1 ×
∞∏
k=n+2
A(Sk)
for every n. Then P =
⋂∞
n=0 Xn, so P is measurable. 
We let P = P∩⊗n ΣSn be the trace σ-algebra on P. By the last lemma, every
probability measure on P can be extended to
∏
nA(Sn) if Sn is countably
generated for all n. We will from now on assume that Sn is countably gen-
erated for all n. All the information that can be obtained from the sequence
(Sn) is encoded in P. Another way to analyze the combined information of
this sequence is by pooling the σ-algebras. Let S =
∨
n Sn be the pooled
σ-algebra. It is woth pointing out that
∨
n Sn 6=
⋃
n Sn unless (Sn) is an
eventually constant sequence. This has been shown in (Broughton & Huff,
1977). Every cell in A(Sn) is the union of cells in A(S) for all n. There is a
natural relation between (A(S),ΣS) and (P,P).
Lemma 6 The function ξ : P → A(S) given by ξ(P1,P2, . . .) =
⋂
n Pn is an
isomorphism.
Proof: It is easily seen that ξ is bijective. Let pi∨m : A(S) → A(Sm) be the
natural projection for each m ∈ N. That pi∨m is measurable for each m
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follows as in the proof of Lemma 4. It is straightforward to check that the
following diagram commutes for all m ∈ N:
P ∩∏nA(Sn) A(S)
A(Sm)
ξ
ξ−1
pm|P pi∨m
We show that ξ is measurable, the proof that ξ−1 is measurable is analo-
gous. Since ΣS is generated by the sets of the form pi∨m
−1
(A) with A ∈ ΣSm
for some m, it suffices to show that ξ−1
(
pi∨m
−1
(A)
) ∈ P. Since pm|P is
measurable, pm|P−1(A) ∈ P. Since the diagram commutes, pm|P−1(A) =
ξ−1
(
pi∨m
−1
(A)
)
. 
Call a family of partitions (Πi) stable, if
⋂
i Pi 6= ∅ for all (Pi) ∈
∏
iΠi.
Stable partitions occur naturally in the modeling of simultaneous choices:
Example 3 Consider a normal form game with player set I and strategy spaces
(Xi). For each player i ∈ I, we can identify her strategies with a certain
partition of Πi∈IXi. For each s ∈ Xi, we let
Ps =
∏
j6=i
Xj × {s}
and let Πi be the partition into sets of the form Ps. The family (Πi) is then
stable.
Note that we made no use of the restriction Sn ⊆ Sn+1 in the proof of
Lemma 6 besides the fact that the intersection of elements of P is nonempty.
Therefore, we have essentially also proven the following:
Lemma 7 Let (Sn) be a sequence of countably generated σ-algebras on the set
S. Then the function ψ :
∏
nA(Sn) →
∨
nA(Sn) given by ψ(P1,P2, . . .) =⋂
n Pn is an isomorphism.
It is hard to interpret increases in information if one can not point at the
uncertainty resolved. Let us therefore define a proper filtration on a set S to
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be a sequence (Sn) of countably generated σ-algebras such that Sn ⊆ Sn+1
and whenever B ∈ Sn+1 is a union of atoms in Sn, we have B ∈ Sn. In
a proper filtration, a player can only learn by making distinctions between
elements previously lying in the same atom.
Ideally, we would like to recover all σ-algebras in a proper filtration from
their atoms and
∨
n Sn. This is in general not possible. Nik Weaver has
contributed the following counterexample on mathoverflow.com.
Example 4 First, let B be the Borel σ-algebra on R and let B ′ be the σ-algebra
generated by B together with one non-Borel set E. Note that E is a union of
atoms of B. Now for each n let Sn be the σ-algebra of subsets of R × N
generated by sets of the form A× [n,∞) for A ∈ B and sets of the form B× {k}
for B ∈ B ′ and k < n. Since B is countably generated, so is each Σn.
The atoms of Sn are the singletons
{
(x,k)
}
for x ∈ R and k < n and the sets
{x}× [n,∞) for x ∈ R. There are no new sets in Sn+1 that are unions of atoms
of Sn. However, E× N appears in the σ-algebra generated by
⋃
n Sn, and this
is a union of atoms of S0.
5.4 Measurable Extensive Forms
We are now able to put the various ingredients together to arrive at a general
model of measurable extensive forms with perfect recall. The formulation
is in the spirit of the extensive forms in (von Neumann & Morgenstern,
1947), which it generalizes. Making a choice amounts to refinining the set
of outcomes that remain feasible.
A measurable extensive form with perfect recall consists of a nonempty count-
able set of players I and for each player i ∈ I two proper filtrations (I in)
and (C in) of a nonempty set W. They represent information and choices,
respectively. For all i ∈ I and n ∈ N let Iin be the set of I in-atoms and Cin
be the set of C in-atoms. We endow them with the σ-algebras ΣI in = I
i
n and
ΣC in = C
i
n, respectively. We require the following conditions to be satisfied:
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M1 I i0 = {W, ∅} for all i ∈ I.
M2 I in+1 is finer than C
i
n for all i ∈ I and n ∈ N.
M3 I in is coarser than C
i
n for all i ∈ I and n ∈ N.
M4 I in+1 is coarser than
∨
i∈I,m6n C
i
n.
M5 For all i ∈ I and natural numbers m < n, if x ∈ Iim ∩ Iin, then x ∈ Cin.
M6 The atoms of
∨
n,i C
i
n are singletons.
We call W the set of plays and endow it with the σ-algebra W =
∨
i,n C
i
n.
The σ-algebra I in represents the information available to player i ∈ I at pe-
riod n and C in the choices available to player i ∈ I at period n. M1 says that
initially, no player knows anything. M2 says that a player can recall what
she did in the period before. M3 says that choices refine information avail-
able. Together, M2 and M3 imply that a player can recall everything she ever
did or knew and thus represent the assumption of perfect recall. M4 says
that players cannot learn anything that cannot be reconstructed from the
choices of players before. M5 says that an information set that player i can
meet twice along a play must be an information set where she cannot actu-
ally do something. M6 says that two plays are only different if some player
made somewhere different choices along the play. Since W =
∨
n,i C
i
n is
countably generated, M6 implies that W has at most the cardinality of the
continuum.3 M6 is essentially without loss of generality from the game the-
oretic point of view. If M6 would fail, we would call the atoms of
∨
n,i C
i
n
plays instead of the elements of W. In that case, we could replace W by a
smaller set without changing the strategic environment so that M6 holds.
In a measurable extensive form, every player has to choose every period.
There is no last period, but this is essentially without loss of generality. If the
game is supposed to actually end, we can reduce the choices of every player
from then on to a single choice. Nothing interesting can happen afterwards.
Implicitly, players can condition on calendar time.
3There must be a function f : W → [0, 1] such that W = σ(f). Since the atoms of W are
singletons, and the Borel σ-algebra on [0, 1] separates points, f must be injective.
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5.5 Strategies
We are now able to discuss what strategies should be. For much of the
discussion, we will drop time and player indices. This allows us to focus on
conceptual problems that have to be dealt with. We will provide complete
definitions afterwards. So we will deal with two countably generated σ-
algebras I and C on a set W and let I and C be the corresponding sets of
atoms endowed with the appropriate σ-algebras I and C. By assumption C
is finer than I.
Primarily, a pure strategy should map pieces of information to available
choices. So it is first and foremost a function s : I→ C. A player who knows
the piece of information x ∈ I also knows that she can only choose a choice
available at x; choices refine information. This imposes the condition that
s(x) ⊆ x for all x ∈ I. Now if we have a distribution over I, a strategy
should also induce a distribution over C and this means that s has to be
measurable. So a pure strategy has to be a measurable function s : I → C
such that s(x) ⊆ x for all x ∈ I.
In finite games, mixed strategies are usually defined as probability distri-
butions over pure strategies. Let S be the family of all pure strategies. There
is a function e : S×I→ C, called the evaluation, defined by e(s, x) = s(x). To
construct probability distributions on S, we need a σ-algebra S on S. Now, if
we have a probability distribution µ on S and a probability distribution ν on
I, we want to be able to talk about the resulting probability distribution on
C. If B ⊆ C is measurable, the probability of a choice lying in B would be
e−1(B) ⊆ S × I. This set should be measurable, so we want e−1(B) ∈ S ⊗ I
for every measurable B, which amounts to e being jointly measurable. But
Aumann has shown in (Aumann, 1961)4 that even in the most well-behaved
case, this is generally impossible:
4The arguments in (Aumann, 1961) are not very accessible. Easier proofs of the same
results can be found in (Rao, 1971), which relies strongly on the machinery of classical
descriptive set theory.
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Example 5 Let W = [0, 1]× [0, 1]. Let I be the set of lines of the form
{
(x,y) : y ∈ [0, 1]}
for some x ∈ [0, 1]. Let C be the set of singleton subsets of W. We can identify
the elements of I with points in the unit interval and of course elements in C
with points in the unit square and endow these sets with the corresponding
σ-algebras. This allows us to identify strategies with measurable functions
f : [0, 1] → [0, 1], and S with the set of such measurable functions. Now the
set of all measurable functions from the unit interval to itself is not of bounded
Borel class.5 It follows from Theorem D in (Aumann, 1961) that there is no
σ-algebra S on S such that e is S⊗ I-measurable.
As a consequence, Aumann uses a different notion of mixed strategy. He
takes mixed strategies to be pure strategies that may condition on an exter-
nal randomization device. In our context, a mixed strategy will be a jointly
measurable function s : Ω× I→ C with (Ω,Σ,µ) being an exogenous prob-
ability space such that f(ω, x) ⊆ x for all x ∈ I and all ω ∈ Ω. The proba-
bility space Ω serves as a randomization device and may be interpreted as a
roulette wheel.
If s : I→ C is a pure strategy, we can treat it as a mixed strategy s ′ such
that s ′(ω, x) = s(x) for all x and the randomization device being arbitrary.
For every measurable set B ⊆ C, s ′−1(B) = Ω × s−1(B), so this is indeed a
mixed strategy. We can therefore treat pure strategies as degenerate mixed
strategies.
In finite games, behavior strategies randomize independently at each infor-
mation set. Let us examine what the equivalent in a more general setting
would be. If (Ω,Σ,µ) is a probability space that incorporates all uncertainty
5One can construct all measurable functions from a separable metric space to another
separable metric space using a transfinite recursion in ω1 steps. A family of measurable
functions such that for some countable ordinal α, all function in it are generated in at most
α steps is of bounded Borel class. Aumann actually uses the notion of Banach class as defined
in (Aumann, 1961). It is pointed out in (Rao, 1971) that a set of functions is of bounded
Borel class if and only if it is of bounded Banach class.
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in a game, (I, I) the information sets and (C,C) the choices taken there, then
we have a natural function f : Ω × I → C. If choices are chosen indepen-
dently at each information set, the family f(x, ·)x∈I should be independent.
Proofs of the following result6 can be found in ((Sun, 1998), Proposition
1.1), and in ((Podczeck, 2010), Remark 3):
Lemma 8 Let (Ω,Σ,µ) and (I, I,ν) be probability spaces. Let (C,C) be a
countably generated measurable space such that the atoms of C are singletons,
and f : Ω × I → C be jointly measurable such that (f(·, x))
x∈I is a family of
independent random variables. Then for ν-almost all x ∈ I, the function f(·, x)
is µ-almost surely equal to a constant.
If nature picks a number from the uniform distribution on [0, 1] and a player
observes this choice perfectly, the player cannot independently randomize
at each information set. But the problem is purely artificial. A play goes
through only countably many information sets. So most information sets
will not lie on the same play. If two information sets can never be passed by
the same play, the joint distribution of behavior at these information sets is
irrelevant for the distribution over plays. A very simple example will clarify
this:
Example 6 A single player has to move twice, in both cases she can choose left
or right. She wants to play each of her four pure strategies with probability
1/4. She can do this in the following way: She initially flips a fair coin and,
depending on the outcome, goes left or right. Afterwards, she flips the coin
again to decide again whether she goes left or right. In this case, she chooses
independently at each node, since the coin flips she makes the second time are
independent.
Another possibility would be to independently flip two coins initially, but look
only at the first coin flipped, which she uses to decide whether to go left or
right. Then, she takes a look at the second coin and the outcome determines
6These papers contain actually a stronger result with a weaker independence condition.
The present version is sufficient for our purposes. Also, these papers assume the product
probability spaces to be completed, but the proofs do not require this assumption.
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her second choice. In this case, the choices at two of the nodes will not be
independent, since choices there are determined by the second coin. But the
dependence is clearly of no relevance.
Relying on this insight, we will only strive for independence along plays
and even that, we achieve only implicitly. We will treat a behavior strat-
egy as a function that maps information sets to probability measures on
available choices. For technical reasons, we will use a technically more con-
venient construction that is equivalent according to Lemma 9 in Appendix
II. A behavioral strategy will be a certain kernel (see Appendix II). The ker-
nel s : I × C → [0, 1] is a behavior strategy if s(x,Cx) = 1 for all x ∈ I with
Cx = {c ∈ C : c ⊆ x}. Note that Cx ∈ C. Since x is an atom of I and
I is countably generated, x ∈ I ⊆ C . Now ⋃Cx = x, hence Cx ∈ C. It
is explained in Appendix II that we can identify measurable functions with
certain kernels, and this allows us to see behavior strategies also as gener-
alizations of pure strategies. We now list the exact definitions:
A pure strategy for player i ∈ I is a sequence (sn) of measurable functions
sn : I
i
n → Cin
such that for all n ∈ N and x ∈ Iin, we have sn(x) ⊆ x.
A mixed strategy for player i ∈ I given the probability space (Ωi,Σi,µi) is a
sequence (sn) of jointly measurable functions
sn : Ωi × Iin → Cin
such that for all n ∈ N, ω ∈ Ωi and x ∈ Iin, we have sn(ω, x) ⊆ x.
A behavior strategy for player i ∈ I is a sequence (bn) of kernels
bn : I
i
n × Cin → [0, 1]
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such that for all n ∈ N and x ∈ Iin, we have bn(x,Cnx ) = 1 with
Cnx =
{
c ∈ Cin : c ⊆ x
} ∈ Cin.
For the sake of convenience, we introduce a fourth kind of strategy that
generalizes all previous notions of strategy:
A generalized strategy for player i ∈ I given the probability space (Ωi,Σi,µi)
is a sequence (sn) of kernels
sn : Ωi ×
n∏
m=0
Iim × Cin → [0, 1]
such that for all n ∈ N and (x0, . . . , xn) ∈
∏n
m=0 I
i
m, we have
µi
{
ω : sn(ω, x0, . . . , xn,Cnx ) = 1
}
= 1.
We consider generalized strategies merely as a technically useful general-
ization of the previous notions of strategies. Since we have perfect recall,
the space
∏n
m=0 I
i
m contains a lot of redundancy, the information is already
contained in Iin. It is straightforward how one can interpret all kinds of
strategies as special forms of generalized strategies. In particular, we only
have to clarify how generalized strategies induce a distribution over plays
in order to show how all kinds of strategies induce distributions over plays.
Consider a measurable extensive form with perfect recall with player set
I, and specify for every player i ∈ I a probability space (Ωi,Σi,µi) and a
generalized strategy (sin) given the corresponding probability space. Also,
letΩ =
∏
iΩi and Σ =
⊗
i Σi and the measure µ =
⊗
i µi. For each n ∈ N,
let
Cn =
∏
i∈I
Cin
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and endow it with the σ-algebra Cn =
⊗
i C
i
n. Similarly, for each n ∈ N, let
In =
∏
i∈I
Iin
and endow it with the σ-algebra In =
⊗
i I
i
n. By Lemma 10 from Appendix
II, we can define kernels
sn : Ω×
n∏
m=0
Im × Cn → [0, 1]
by taking the product of all the sin. Our next step is to dispose of the Im. By
M2-M4 in the definition of measurable extensive forms with perfect recall
and Lemma 7, we have a natural, measurable projection
ι : Cn−1 →
n∏
m=0
Im
for each n > 1 that has a right inverse ιr. That is, ι ◦ ιr is the identity on∏n
m=0 Im. We do not claim that ιr is measurable. We use ι to define a
kernel that does not depend on the spaces (Iin). Define a kernel
s˜n : Ω× Cn−1 × Cn → [01]
by
s˜n(ω, c,B) = sn(ω, ι(c),B)
for all ω ∈ Ω, c ∈ Cn−1, B ∈ Cn, and n > 0. For n = 0 we let
s˜0 : Ω× C0 → [0, 1]
be defined by
s˜0(ω,B) = s0
(
ω,
∏
i
W,B
)
for all ω ∈ Ω and B ∈ C0. By applying Lemma 11 from Appendix II to
µ and the sequence (s˜n), we obtain a unique probability measure ν on
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(∏
nCn,
⊗
n Cn
)
, that is supported on the underlying projective limit. The
latter is ensured by the condition we imposed on generalized strategies. By
applying Lemma 6 and Lemma 7, we obtain a unique measure on the atoms
of
∨
i,n C
i
n. By M5, these atoms are singletons, so we have actually de-
fined a probability measure on (W,W), which we denote by τ. We call this
probability measure the outcome of the strategy profile.
5.6 Kuhn’s Theorem
In this section, we analyze the relationship between mixed and behavior
strategies. Consider a game with player set I, and specify for every player
i ∈ I a probability space (Ωi,Σi,µi).
We say that player i ∈ I has the Kuhn property if for every mixed strategy
(sin) of i, there exists a behavior strategy (b
i
n) such that for every profile
(s−in ) of generalized strategies for all players but i, the outcomes of (s
i
n, s
−i
n )
and (bin, s
−i
n ) are the same. The fact that in a finite game of perfect recall,
every player has the Kuhn property, is Kuhn’s theorem. The following exam-
ple shows that this may fail without further assumptions in our framework:
Example 7 There exists a set S, two countably generated σ-algebras S and
S ′ ⊆ S that separate points, and a probability measure ν on S such that there
exists no kernel k : S×S→ [0, 1] with the first coordinate S ′ measurable, such
that
µ(A ∩A ′) =
∫
A ′
k(·,A) dν
for all A ∈ S and A ′ ∈ S ′ (see Example 10.4.19 in (Bogachev, 2007)). Our
game will have a single player, so we drop player indices. Her randomization
device is Ω = S × S endowed with the σ-algebra S ′ ⊗ S and the probability
measure µ specified by
µ(A× B) = ν(A ∩ B).
We let W = S× S. Obviously, I0 = {W, ∅}. We let
C0 = I1 =
{
A× S : A ∈ S ′}.
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Finally, C1 = Cn = In = S⊗ S for n > 1. The game effectively ends after two
rounds and is of perfect information. So we have G = ∅. We let
s0
(
(s1, s2),W
)
= {s1}× S
for all (s1, s2) ∈ Ω. Also, we let
sn
(
(s1, s2), x
)
=
{
(s1, s2)
}
for all n > 0, (s1, s2) ∈ Ω and x ∈ In. The outcome τ of the strategy is
supported on the diagonal of S× S and τ(A×A) = ν(A) for all A×A ∈W.
We show that there is no behavioral strategy that gives the same outcome.
Suppose for the sake of contradiction that (bn) would be such a behavioral
strategy. Clearly, we must have
b0
(
W,A× S) = ν(A)
for all A× S ∈ C0. Also, b1 must satisfy
τ
(
(A ′ × S)× (S×A)) = ν(A ∩A ′) = ∫
A ′×S
b1(·,A) dτ0
for all A ′ × S ∈ I0 and A ∈ C1 with τ0 being the marginal of τ on C0 = I1.
But this means that we can define a kernel k : S× S→ [0, 1] by
k(s,B) = b1
(
{s}× S,S× B
)
that satisfies the conditions no kernel can satisfy by assumption.
To simplify the discussion for what it takes for a player to have the Kuhn
property, we show that it suffices to analyze a certain class of two-player
games.
Proposition 1 Consider a game with player set I, and specify for every player
i ∈ I a probability space (Ωi,Σi,µi). Let i ∈ I be any player. There exists a
two-player game with players i∗ and j∗, such that i has the Kuhn property in
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the original game if i∗ has the Kuhn property in the new game. Moreover, j∗ is
perfectly informed about the past.
Proof: We construct a player j∗ who represents the pool of all players but
i. The underlying set of plays W will be the same. Also, we will simply let
i∗ = i. Her randomization device will still be (Ωi,Σi,µi) and she will still
have the filtrations (I in) and (C
i
n). The filtrations of player j
∗ will be given
by I j
∗
0 = {W, 0} and for all n > 0, I
j∗
n =
∨
k6=i,m<n C
k
m. For all n ∈ N, we
let C j
∗
n =
∨
k6=i C
k
n . The randomization device of j
∗ will be
∏
k6=iΩi with
σ-algebra
⊗
k6=i Σk and probability measure
⊗
k6=i µk. It is easily verified
that this provides us with two-player game with players i∗ and j∗. As in
our construction of outcomes, we can combine generalized strategies of all
players other than i in the original game to one big generalized strategy of
j∗ in the new game. 
Since player j∗ in the proof does not have to use the Ωk independently and
can condition on more information, player i having the Kuhn property in the
new game will generally be more demanding than having it in the original
game. For the rest of the section, we will study two player games played
by Ann and Bob under the assumption that Bob is informed of every choice
made by someone and study when Ann has the Kuhn property. We will drop
the index for Ann’s mixed or behavior strategies.
We let (sn) be a mixed strategy of Ann. When looking for an equivalent
behavior strategy, it is clear what b0 has to be, since b0 is essentially a prob-
ability measure on C0 that has to equal the distribution of s0 on C0. The
hard step is finding b1. Finding the rest of the sequence (bn) is then anal-
ogous. A sufficient condition is that the randomization device (Ω,Σ,µ) of
Ann is perfect. This is the only place where we need a regularity assumption.
Theorem 1 Ann has the Kuhn property if her randomization device (Ω,Σ,µ)
is perfect.
Proof: We start under the assumption that her randomization device is per-
fect and countably generated. It suffices to construct b1, constructing the
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remaining (b2, . . .) works analogously by iterating the proof. Let pi : I1 → C0
be the canonical projection and κpi : I1 × C0 → [0, 1] its rendition as a ker-
nel. Let κs1 : Ω× C1 → [0, 1] be the rendition of s1 as a kernel. We define a
measure ν on C0 ×Ω by
ν(B×A) = µ(s−10 (B) ∩A)
for all B ∈ C0 and A ∈ Σ. By slight abuse of notation, s0 is treated as
a function s0 : Ω → C0. By Lemma 12, there is a kernel κ : C0 × Σ →
[0, 1] such that ν = µs−10 ⊗ κ. There is now a kernel κI : I1 × Σ → [0, 1]
given by κI = κpi ⊗ κ. The probability measure κI(x, ·) gives the conditional
probability of measurable subsets of Ω, given that Ann has observed the
piece of information x. That the piece of information x may also contain
information on Bob’s choices in the first period is irrelevant. We now let
b1 : I1 × C1 → [0, 1] be given by
b1(x,B) = κI
(
x,
{
ω : s1(ω, x) ∈ B
})
.
To see that b1 is actually a kernel, note that you can first take the pointwise
product of κI and the identity kernel on I1 to obtain a kernel from I1 to
Ω × I1 and then apply the kernel κs1 . The kernel thus obtained is exactly
b1.
We now show that (b0,b1) gives rise to the same behavior in the periods
0 and 1 as (s0, s1), no matter what Bob is doing. So let CB be a countably
generated σ-algebra onW with set of atoms CB and the σ-algebra CB on CB.
The set CB represents the period 0 choices of Bob. We requireI1 ⊆ Cb∨C0.
Bob’s behavior in period 0 is fully described by a probability measure β on
(CB,CB). Now we can construct the joint distribution on Ω × C0 × CB ×
C1 by combining µ, (s0, s1), and β. But by construction, we get the same
distribution from (b0,b1), β and κ. So the marginals on C0 × CB × C1 are
the same. For bn with n > 1, the same argument works, but one has to use
a kernel for Bob and take his randomization device into account.
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Finally, we dispose of the assumption that (Ω,Σ,µ) is countably generated.
We used Lemma 12 to find for each c ∈ C0 the conditional probabilities of
all events in Σ given c. But we do not need to know all these probabilities.
We only need to know the probabilities of events of the form s−10 (A) for
A ∈ C0 or {ω : s1(ω, x) ∈ B} for B ∈ C1 and x ∈ I1. But all these events lie
in a countably generated sub-σ-algebra. This is obvious for the events of the
form s−10 (A), we just have to take preimages of a countable set of generators
for C0. We now show that there is a countably generated σ-algebra Σ ′ ⊆ Σ
such that {ω : s1(ω, x) ∈ B} ∈ Σ ′ for all x ∈ I1. Note that these are actually
x-sections of the sets s−11 (B) with B ∈ C1, so it suffices to find a countably
generated Σ ′ ⊆ Σ such that s1 is Σ ′ ⊗ I1-measurable. Let
{
F0, F1, F2, . . .
}
be
a countable set of generators of C1. For each n ∈ N, there is a countable
family Gn ⊆ Σ such that
s−11 (Fn) ∈ σ
({
A× B : A ∈ Gn,B ∈ I1
})
,
so we can just let Σ ′ = σ
(⋃
n Gn
)
. Since (Ω,Σ,µ) is perfect, the probability
space (Ω,Σ ′,µ) is perfect too. 
5.7 Discussion
It should be clear from both Example 7 and Theorem 1 that the validity of
Kuhn’s theorem in the general case depends on the possibility to represent
conditional probabilities as kernels, so called regular conditional probabil-
ities. It is not clear whether the assumption that Ann’s randomization de-
vice is perfect can be seriously weakened. It is an open question whether
there exists any probability space that is not perfect, but for which regu-
lar conditional probabilities exist for every sub-σ-algebra (see page 779 in
(Ramachandran, 2002)).
Even though the frameworks are not directly comparable, as far as the
conditioning aspect goes, Theorem 1 is stronger than the corresponding ver-
sions of Kuhn’s theorem obtained in (Aumann, 1964) and (Mertens et al.,
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1994). We require neither choices nor randomization devices to be stan-
dard Borel. It is not entirely clear whether the assumption that choices are
standard Borel is essential to the proof in (Mertens et al., 1994). The formal
statement there (Theorem II.1.4) certainly requires them, but the authors
seem to prove a slightly stronger theorem in their proof and use the as-
sumption only there. They want to construct equivalent behavior strategies
for a class of strategies even larger than our class of generalized strategies.
They allow a different randomization device to be used in every period. The
standard Borel assumption on choices allows them to replace these random-
ization devices by a single randomization device.
A strong point of our formulation of extensive forms is that our formu-
lation of perfect recall does not require extraneous objects such as the mea-
surable recall functions used by Aumann and Mertens, Sorin, Zamir. The
projections serve as recall functions and their measurability is automatic in
our framework.
The biggest problem in the current formulation is of course that exten-
sive forms without perfect recall or without a common notion of time for
all player cannot even be formulated. For now, we provide a sketch of how
one can extend the framework. Essentially, we can “glue” information sets
together. We glue the information sets x ∈ Iin and y ∈ Iim together by re-
quiring player i to behave the same way at both information sets. For this,
we need a notion of having the same choices available at x and y. Formally,
we take a function g : x→ y that is x∩C in/y∩C im-bimeasurable and has the
property that for every C in-atom c ⊆ x, there is a C im-atom c ′ ⊆ y such that
g(c) ⊆ c ′. By Lemma 3, the function pi(g) gives us an isomorphism between
the choices available at x and the choices available at y. This way of gluing
together information sets allows us to model much more general extensive
forms. The open question is how to characterize perfect recall in terms of
such functions g. This question is however independent of the measurability
questions that have guided us thus far.
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5.8 Appendix I: General Preliminaries
The set of natural numbers {0, 1, 2, . . .} is denoted by N. A set is countable if
it can be mapped injectively into N. The power set of a set S is denoted by
2S. We will often use index-free notation for set-theoretic operations. If S is
a set and F ⊆ 2F, then⋃
F =
{
x ∈ S : x ∈ F for at least one F ∈ F}
and ⋂
F =
{
x ∈ S : x ∈ F for all F ∈ F}.
Note that
⋃ ∅ = ∅. The family F is closed under countable unions if ⋃C ∈ F
whenever C is a countable subset of F. The family F is closed under comple-
ments if S− F = {x ∈ S : x /∈ F} ∈ F whenever F ∈ F.
A σ-algebra S on a set S is a family of subsets of S closed under complements
and countable unions. There always is a largest such σ-algebra, the power-
set 2S. We will usually endow finite sets with this σ-algebra. The elements
of a σ-algebra S are measurable sets or, if it needs clarification, S-measurable
sets. In a probabilistic context, we also call them events. If S1 and S2 are
both σ-algebras on S then we say that S1 is finer than S2 or S2 coarser than
S1 if S2 ⊆ S1. If F is any family of subsets of S, there is a coarsest σ-algebra
on S that contains all elements of F. We call it the σ-algebra generated by
F and denote it by σ(F). A useful and easily proven fact is that whenever
A ∈ σ(F), there is countable set C ⊆ F such that A ∈ σ(C). The σ-algebra S
is countably generated if there is a countable family C such that S = σ(C). If
(Si)i∈I is a family of σ-algebras on S, we let
∨
i∈I Si = σ
(⋃
i∈I Si
)
.
A measurable space is a pair (S, S) with S being a σ-algebra on S. If it is clear
from the context which σ-algebra is employed, we might dare to speak of
the measurable space S. We will always endow the unit interval [0, 1] with
the σ-algebra generated by its closed subsets, the Borel σ-algebra B. It is
countably generated, since B is also generated by the closed subintervals
with rational endpoints. If (S, S) is a measurable space and A ⊆ S, the trace
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σ-algebra A ∩ S on A is given by A ∩ S = {A ∩ B : B ∈ S}. It is countably
generated if S is.
A family C of subsets of set S is a pi-system if A ∩ B ∈ C for all A,B ∈ C. A
family D of subsets of set S is a D-system if S ∈ D, A − B ∈ D whenever
A,B ∈ D and B ⊆ A, and ⋃n Bn ∈ D whenever (Dn) is a sequence in
D such that Dn ⊆ Dn+1 for all n ∈ N. The monotone class theorem says
that if C is a pi-system and D a D-system on a set S such that C ⊆ D, then
σ(C) ⊆ D. For a proof, see Theorem 1.1 in (Kallenberg, 2002).
A function f : S → T with (S, S) and (T ,T) being measurable spaces is
S/T-measurable or just measurable if f−1(B) ∈ S for all B ∈ T. A sufficient
condition for f being measurable is that f−1(B) ∈ S for all B ∈ F, with F
being a family such that σ(F) = T. If S is a set, (T ,T) a measurable space,
and f : S → T a function, there is a coarsest σ-algebra on S that makes f
measurable. We denote it by σ(f). It is given by
{
f−1(B) : B ∈ T}.
Every countably generated σ-algebra is of the form σ(f) for some f taking
values in [0, 1] (Theorem 6.5.5. in (Bogachev, 2007)). If T is a set, (S, S) a
measurable space and f : S → T a function, there is a finest σ-algebra on T
that makes f measurable. It is given by
{
B ⊆ T : f−1(B) ∈ S}.
If (Si, Si)i∈I is a family of measurable spaces, we let
⊗
i∈I Si be the prod-
uct σ-algebra on
∏
i∈I Si, the coarsest σ-algebra that makes all coordinate
projections measurable. Alternatively, it is generated by the measurable
rectangles. A measurable rectangle is the cartesian product of a family
(Ai) ∈
∏
i Si such that Ai = Si for all but finitely many indices i.
Let (S, S) and (T ,T) be measurably spaces and A ∈ S⊗ T, s ∈ S, and t ∈ T .
We call the set {
(s,y) ∈ A : for some y ∈ T
}
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the s-section of A and define the t-section of A similarly. The s-section of
A is in T and the t-section of A is in S. To see this, note that the set of
subsets of S× T such that the s-section is in S and the t-section is in S forms
a σ-algebra that contains all measurable rectangles.
We always endow products of measurable spaces with their product σ-
algebra. We sometimes call a measurable function defined on a product
jointly measurable when we want to emphasize it is measurable with respect
to the product σ-algebra. If (S,T) and (T ,T) are measurable spaces and
f : S→ T is measurable, then the graph Γ(f) is a measurable subset in S⊗ T
if and only if there is a countably generated σ-algebra T ′ ⊆ T such that
{f(s)} ∈ T ′ for all s ∈ S and such that f is S/T ′-measurable (Proposition 2.1
in (Musiał, 1980)).
A (measurable) isomorphism between two measurable spaces is a measur-
able bijection with a measurable inverse. Two measurable spaces connected
by an isomorphism are identical up to a relabeling of points. We call them
isomorphic. A measurable function such that the forward image of every
measurable set is measurable, is bimeasurable. Note that an isomorphism is
exactly a bijective, bimeasurable function. A measurable space is a standard
Borel space if it is isomorphic to [0, 1] or a countable subset thereof with the
trace σ-algebra. Standard Borel spaces occur frequently in nature according
to the following result of Kazimierz Kuratowski: Any complete and separa-
ble metric space endowed with the σ-algebra generated by the open sets is
standard Borel. For a proof, see Theorem 13.1.1 in (Dudley, 2002).
We will assume that the reader is familiar with probability measures and the
rudiments of Lebesgue integration.
A partition Π on a set S is a family of disjoint nonempty sets such that⋃
Π = S. The elements of a partition are cells. The partition comes with a
natural projections pi : S → Π that maps each x ∈ S to the unique element
P ∈ Π such that x ∈ P. If Π1 and Π2 are both partitions on S, we say that Π1
is finer than Π2 or that Π2 is coarser than Π1 if every cell in Π2 is the union
of cells in Π1.
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5.9 Appendix II: Kernels and Conditional Probability
Kernels are ubiquitous in probability theory. They are variously known as
Markov kernels, transition probabilities, conditional probabilities, random
mappings, random measures, Young measures, and probably a lot of other
names.
Let (S, S) and (T ,T) be measurable spaces. A kernel from S to T is a function
κ : S× T → [0, 1] such that the following conditions hold:
(i) κ(·,B) is measurable for all B ∈ T.
(ii) κ(s, ·) is a probability measure for all s ∈ S.
We interpret κ(s,B) as the probability of going from s to an element of B. We
can also interpret kernels als functions with probability measures as values.
To make this precise, let ∆(T) be the set of probability measures on (T ,T)
and endow ∆(T) with the σ-algebra generated by events of the form
{µ ∈ ∆(T) : µ(B) 6 r}
for some B ∈ T and r ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 9 Let (S, S) and (T ,T) be measurable spaces. Let p : S → ∆(T) be a
measurable function. Then κ : S × T → [0, 1] given by κ(s,B) = p(s)(B) is a
kernel. Moreover, every kernel can be obtained this way.
Proof: See Lemma 1.40 in (Kallenberg, 2002). 
It should be noted that kernels generalize ordinary measurable functions. If
f : S→ T is measurable, we can identify f with the kernel κf : S× T → [0, 1]
given by
κf(s,B) =
{
1 if f(s) ∈ B,
0 if f(s) /∈ B.
To see that this is actually a kernel, note that κf(·,B)−1
(
{1}
)
= f−1(B). This
identification is injective if and only if all atoms in T that contain points in
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f(S) are singletons. Similarly, we can view probability measures as kernels
that are constant in the first argument.
The arbitrary product of kernels is again a kernel:
Lemma 10 Let
(
(Si, Si), (Ti,Ti)
)
i∈I be an arbitrary family of pairs of mea-
surable spaces and let κi : Si × Ti → [0, 1] be a kernel for every i ∈ I. Then
the function
κ :
∏
i
Si ×
⊗
i
Ti → [0, 1]
given by
κ(s,B) =
⊗
i
κi(s, ·)(B)
is a kernel.
Proof: We only have to verify that κ(·,B) is ⊗i Si-measurable for every
B ∈ ⊗i Ti, which we do by employing the monotone-class theorem. Let
D ⊆⊗i Ti be the family of all measurable sets B such that κ(·,B) is ⊗i Si-
measurable.
We first show that every measurable rectangle is in D. Let F ⊆ I be a set
with n elements and
B = B1 × . . .× Bn ×
∏
i∈I\F
Ti
be a measurable rectangle. Then
κ(s,B) = κ1(s1,B1)× . . .× κn(sn,Bn)
is a product of measurable functions and therefore measurable.
Now let A,B ∈ D with B ⊆ A.Then
κ(·,A\B) = κ(·,A) − κ(·,B),
a measurable function as the difference of two measurable functions.
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Finally, Let (Bn) be an increasing sequence in D with limit B =
⋃
n Bn and
let r ∈ [0, 1]. Then
κ(·,B)−1([0, r]) =⋂
n
κ(·,Bn)−1
(
[0, r]
)
,
by the continuity of measures. Since measurable rectangles form a pi-system,
we conclude by the monotone-class theorem that D =
⊗
i Ti. 
It is possible to chain kernels. Let (S, S), (T ,T) and (U,U) be measurable
spaces and κ1 : S × T → [0, 1] and κ2 : S × T × U → [0, 1] be kernels. Then
one can define a kernel κ1 ⊗ κ2 : S× T ⊗ U→ [0, 1] by letting
(κ1 ⊗ κ2)(s,B) =
∫ ∫
1B(t,u) dκ2(s, t, ·) dκ1(s, ·)
for all B ∈ T ⊗ U. For a proof that κ1 ⊗ κ2 is actually a kernel, see Lemma
1.41(iii) in (Kallenberg, 2002). The kernel κ1 ⊗ κ2 corresponds to the in-
tuitive notion that given s, an element t of T is randomly chosen according
to κ1(s, ·) and then an element u ∈ U is randomly chosen according to
κ2(s, t, ·).
It is worth pointing out that there is a category with measurable spaces as
objects and kernels as morphisms. Composition is done by chaining ker-
nels, and the identities are the kernels corresponding to the identity func-
tion. This category was termed the category of probabilistic mappings in
(Lawvere, 1962) and termed the category of statistical decisions in (Cˇencov,
1982).
The following, incredibly useful, result is known as the Ionescu-Tulcea the-
orem. For a proof, see Theorem 6.17 in (Kallenberg, 2002).
Lemma 11 Let (Sn, Sn) be a sequence of measurable spaces and let (κn) be a
sequence of kernels such that
κn : S0 × . . .× Sn × Sn+1 → [0, 1].
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Then there exists a unique kernel
κ : S0 ×
∞⊗
n=1
Sn → [0, 1]
such that
κ(s,B1 × . . .× Bn × Sn+1 × . . .) = κ0 ⊗ . . .⊗ κn−1(s,B1 × . . .× Bn)
for all s ∈ S0 and B1 × . . .× Bn ∈ S1 × . . .× Sn.
For each s ∈ S0, the Ionescu-Tulcea theorem provides us with a stochastic
process on
∏∞
n=1 Sn. We use the result to show that randomized strategies
induce distributions over outcomes. We can also use the Ionescu-Tulcea the-
orem to provide a different proof of Lemma 10 for countably many kernels.
Given two measurable spaces (S, S) and (T ,T), it is possible to construct a
unique probability measure µ⊗ κ on S× T from a probability measure µ on
(S, S) and a kernel κ : S× T → [0, 1] such that
µ⊗ κ(A× B) =
∫
A
κ(s,B) dµ
for allA×B ∈ S×T. Clearly, the marginal of µ⊗κ is µ. That is, µ⊗κ(A×T) =
µ(A) for all A ∈ S. In that case, we can view κ as giving us for every
s, the conditional probability of every measurable subset of T . Not every
probability measure on a product can be decomposed into the marginal and
a kernel.
A probability space (Ω,Σ,µ) is perfect if for each random variable f : Ω→ R,
there exists a Borel set B ⊆ f(Ω) such that µf−1B = 1. Clearly, if (Ω,Σ,µ)
is perfect and Σ ′ is a sub-σ-algebra of Σ, the space (Ω,Σ ′,µ) is perfect too.
The class of perfect measure spaces has been introduced by Kolmogorov and
Gnedenko in (Gnedenko & Kolmogorov, 1968) in order “to achive complete
harmony between the abstract theory of measure and the theory of measure
in metric spaces.”
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We have the following useful result due to Arnold Faden in (Faden, 1985):
Lemma 12 Let (S, S,µ) be a countably generated probability space. Then
(S, S,µ) is perfect if and only if for every measurable space (T ,T) and every
probability measure ν on (T ×S,T⊗S) with marginal µ on T , there is a kernel
κ : T × S→ [0, 1] such that ν = µ⊗ κ.
Lemma 12 will be our tool of choice for constructing conditional probabil-
ities. The kernel κ will in general not be unique, but two such kernels can
only differ on µ-null set.
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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three papers dealing with the analysis of games
in which time is essential.
The first paper, "Payoff-Relevance” deals with the foundations behind the
solution concept of Markov perfect equilibrium in games with observable ac-
tions. This solution concept is based on a notion of payoff-relevant states.
Maskin and Tirole have shown that one can derive the states from the exten-
sive form under certain finiteness assumptions. This paper shows that these
assumptions can be disposed of. Moreover, it is shown that the approach
of Maskin and Tirole is not invariant with respect to payoff-irrelevant rela-
bellings of actions. For a large class of games, a fix is provided in the form
of a canonical labeling that respects certain symmetries within the game.
In the second paper, "Commitment in Extensive Form Games”, I analyze
what can happen if players in an extensie form game are allowed to make
binding public commitments at each stage. It is shown that every outcome
induced by a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is compatible with these com-
mitment possibilities. A series of examples illustrates the approach.
The third paper, "Strategic Stochastic Processes” is joint work with Klaus
Ritzberger. We formulate and prove a version of Kuhn’s theorem in a general
measure theoretic framework: In a game of perfect recall, there exists for
each mixed strategy of a player a behavior strategy such that the induced
distribution over outcomes is the same, no matter how other players behave.
In the process, we introduce a clean way of modeling partitional information
in a measure theoretic framework.
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Zusammenfassung
Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei Arbeiten zur Analyse von Spielen in de-
nen Zeit eine essentielle Rolle spielt.
Die erste Arbeit, "Payoff-Relevance”, analysiert wie sich der Zustandsraum
der dem Gleihgewichtskonzept von Markovgleichgewichten zugrundeliegt
von der Extensivform ableiten lässt. In einer früheren Arbeit haben Maskin
und Tirole gezeigt dass sich payoffrelevante Zustände unter gewissen End-
lichkeitsannahmen aus der Extensivform ableiten lassen. Hier wird gezeigt
dass diese Annahmen überflüssig sind. Weiters wird gezeigt dass die Meth-
ode von Maskin und Tirole nich invariant unter dem Umbenennen von Ak-
tionen ist. Dieses Problem wird für eine weite Klasse von Spielen gelößt.
In der zweiten Arbeit, "Commitment in Extensive Form Games”, analysiere
ich was passiert wenn Spieler in einem Extensivformspiel die Möglichkeit
haben in jeder Runde bindende Verpflichtungen einzugehen. Jedes Nash-
gleichgewicht in reinen Strategien kann auf diese weise gespielt werden.
Eine Reihe von Beispielen illustriert meinen Zugang.
Die dritte Arbeit wurde zusammen mit Klaus Ritzberger verfasst. Wir for-
mulieren und beweisen eine Variante des Satzes von Kuhn in einem all-
gemeinen maßtheoretischen Rahmen: In einem Spiel, in dem sich jede
Spielerin daran erinnern kann was sie getan und gewusst hat, gibt es für
jede gemischte Strategie eine Verhaltensstrategie, die für jedes Verhalten
der anderen Spieler die gleiche Verteilung über die Partien induziert.
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